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ABSTRAcr 
In the first quarter of the century, Knoxville's 
business-civic leadership in the late nineteenth century 
agreed that 
of econani.c 
the city's 
developnent. 
prosperity demmded an active program 
Most believed that the proper 
direction to take was to foster 
expansion. Such a plan required 
and capital . 
industrial-commercial 
attracting outside industry 
The city's pranoters also believed that attracting new 
investment required ccmmmity solidarity behind any and 
every booster proposal . Knoxvi 11 e' s business-civic 1 eaders 
rarely managed, however, to translate these convictions into 
a tmity of purpose behind various developmental schemes. The 
fall owing study asks why Knoxvi 11 e' s boosters remained 
seriously divided despite their efforts to rraintain a social 
consensus for industrial-carrnercial developnent. At least 
part of the answer lies in the fact that the city's 
business-civic leadership failed to keep a mutual canni.tment 
to Knoxville's econani.c developnent above the mire of local 
political bickering and factionalism. As a result, they 
failed to translate a consensus for industrial-ccmnercial 
progress into a consensus on issues with iJ1i)ortant 
ramifications for their developnental aims. 
Part cne of this thesis dem::mstrates that Knoxville's 
v 
boosters believed that a social consensus behind their 
schemes and programs was crucial to attracting new industry 
successfully. A subsidy election held in 1887 to subscribe 
public rooney to two new railroads illustrates that 
business-civic boosters were dete�ned to establish at 
least the appearance of hanrony to faci 1 i tate their 
recruitment efforts. Throughout the subsidy canpai.gn, 
boosters stressed the importance of diminishing the public 
visibility of dissent expressed towards the subsidy 
propositions. Local newspapers called for enthusiastic 
supporters to convince those inclined to vote against the 
propositions to refrain fran voting at all. For 
business-civic leaders convinced of the all-consuming 
necessity of recruiting industry and investment fran outside 
the cannuni. ty, the appearance of a social consensus 
outweighed the importance of dissent as a "quality-check" 
the efficacy of certain schemes. 
The stiff CCI'It'etition of htmdreds of other southern 
ccmnuni ties looking to prosper by the same rrethods led 
business-civic boosters to emphasize the less obvious 
advantages 
investor. 
their ccmmmi.ty offered to any prospective 
In Knoxville, 1 ike many other towns, boosters 
stressed the city's alleged social and political harmony. 
on 
They hoped that a ccmmm:i ty that "tmaniJTously" supported all 
rrethods of fostering industrial-carrnercial prosperity would 
vi 
pranise enough politicaL econanic and social stability to 
attract outside capital. Despite their exaggerations, 
however, boosters clearly recognized that Knoxvillians did 
not agree unaniioous 1 y to much of anything. Their appeals to 
black citizens, the white working-class, rural citizens and 
wealthy conservatives during the subsidy election suggested 
that they believed these groups were likely to oppose the 
propositions. 
Part Two of this thesis examines political conflict in 
the 1890s in order to expand our tmderstanding of the 
divisions that persisted in spite of the developnental 
consensus. The municipal controversies of 1893 and 1894 
appear to be typical of public issues daninating local 
headlines throughout the era. As a rapidly expanding city, a 
growing demmd for urban services plagued city leaders 
struggling to modernize a limited infrastructure. Boosters 
believed that irrproved urban amenities, such as 
transportation and utilities, attracted investors while a 
deteriorating city repelled them. Thus, rnunicipal schemes 
became central to the efforts of Knoxvi 11 e' s promoters; 
however, such schemes also often provoked opposition. By 
examining the controversies 
Carrpany and the Knoxville, 
surro\mding the Knoxville Water 
CUmberland Gap and Louisvi 11 e 
Rai 1 road schemes in 1893 and 1894, I hoped to determine who 
opposed these schemes, why they were against them, and if 
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such opposition was related to statewide faction politics. 
The rmmicipal election of 1893-4 reveals sanething of 
the nature of this dispute because these controversies 
became central to the carrpaigning of both Derocrats and 
Republicans. On the surface the dispute might be dismissed 
as sinple De.loocratic versus Republican rivalry. In addition, 
personal factionalism perhaps explains why sane Democrats 
chose one side over another. However, as the campaign 
proceeded, both parties adopted anti-ring and pro-reform 
rhetoric. This suggests that a measure of general discontent 
with city leadership characterized a portion of Knoxville's 
business-civic community. 
Opposition to the nnmicipal schanes reflected a concern 
that the KWC and the KCG&L proposals would saddle the city 
with tmwanted and tmwise debt. The national depression 
plaguing the country at the time probably heightened this 
concern. Reform-minded Knoxvillians believed that corruption 
threatened the city's "progress" and developnent because it 
led sane city officials to back questionable nnmicipal 
scherres . The solution, in their view, was to oust the city 
cotmcil "clique" fran office and replace it with a body of 
experienced, wise and honest businessmen camri.tted first and 
last to the city's overall progress. Thus, the election of 
1894 became a battleground between two groups of 
business-boosters whose canni tment to developnent failed to 
viii 
unite them behind important developmental schemes . 
In 1887, boosters saw 
the business-civic ccmmmity 
certain Knoxvillians outside 
as the citizens roost likely 
oppose the railroad subsidies. In 1893, however, boosters 
disagreed arrong thernsel ves over the rmmicipal schemes. A 
political consensus behind booster plans may have seemed 
of 
to 
extrE!ITely �ortant in recruiting capital successfully, but 
Knoxvi 11 e 's praooters were unable to draw on such a 
consensus when discord characterized the business-civic 
camnmity itself. Local political bickering and factionalism 
divided Knoxville's leadership, and tmdenni.ned efforts to 
praoote an image of unity as a key element of the 
development effort. 
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In 1826 , physician, historian, fa:rmer and entrepreneur 
J .G. M .  Ramsey joined other Knoxvillians to wel cane the 
arrival of the first steamboat ever to nake the perilous 
journey up the Tennessee River to Knoxvil le successful ly. A 
jubilant and eager crotd greeted captain Wil liam Cooner of 
Cincinatti as the Atlas stea:l'lboat chugged past Knoxvil le to 
Ramsey's bane at the Forks of the River . The enthusiastic 
reception that met capt . Connor' s  arrival reflected a broad 
concern with the languishing condition of Knoxvil le's  trade . 
Although the city served as an agricultural and ccmnercial 
hub for East Tennessee, the surrounding roountains and a 
nearly unnavigable river limited the town's prosperity. 
Knoxvil le' s leadership cast a covetous eye towards the West 
where Nashvil l e  and MEII1\')his seemed to be beaning by 
cttq?arison. 1 
Most Knoxvillians in the 1820s and 1830s probably 
agreed that sanehow the city bad to transcend these barriers 
in order to develop and prosper. Yet even this early, 
Knoxville' s leadership did not agree on the direction their 
1 Wil l iam B.  Hesseltine, eel. , Dr. J.G.M. �=-
Autobiography and Letters_ (Nashvil le, TN :  Tennessee Historical 
Ccmndssian, 1954), vii-xvi . 
2 
efforts should take to diminish the town' s  trade isolation. 
Sare praninent leaders , including Dr . Ramsey's brother 
William B.A. Ramsey, dreamed of irra?roving the navigability 
of the Tennessee River. Cleating a channel or digging a 
canal would clear obstructions like the "Boiling Pot" fran 
disrupting the course · of the river fran East Tennessee into 
Alabama. Dr . Ramsey aided efforts to irrprove the Tennessee 
River, yet he believed that a water route to Muscle Shoals , 
and ultimately to New Orleans ,  did not represent the best 
route to prosperity for East Tennessee. Instead, Dr. Ramsey 
"turned his gaze away fran the beautiful siren which 
stretched before his door to lure men on to Muscle Shoals .  
He looked instead across the 100\Jlltains and saw a vision of a 
substitute river that ran on iron and could be made to go 
where men wil led. " 2 
Like Dr . Ramsey and his brother in the first quarter of 
the century, Knoxvi 11 e'  s business-civic leadership in the 
late nineteenth century agreed that the city' s  prosperity 
demanded an active program of econanic developnent . Most 
believed that the proper direction to take was to foster 
industrial-commercial 
attracting outside 
expansion. Such a plan required 
industry and capital . 
The city ' s  pranoters also believed that attracting new 
investment required camruni ty solidarity behind any and 
2 Ibid. , ix . 
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every booster proposal .  Knoxville's business-civic leaders 
rarely managed, however, to translate these convictions into 
a unity of purpose behind various developnental schemes . The 
following study asks why Knoxville's boosters ratained 
seriously divided despite their efforts to rraintain a social 
consensus for industrial-cannercial development . At least 
part of the answer 1 ies in the fact that the city' s  
business-civic leadership failed to keep a Jmltual carmitment 
to Knoxville's  econanic developnent above the mire of local 
political bickering and factionalism. As a result ,  they 
failed to translate a consensus for industrial-cannercial 
progress into a consensus on issues with important 
ramifications for their developmental aims. 
In 1951, C .  Vann Woodward argued that a ''new rising 
middle-class" assl..lmed political , econanic and social 
hegem:my in the South with the fomerly ascendant planter 
class defeated and decimated by the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Woodward 's  thesis that discontinuity in 
southern leadership, institutions and "ethos" characterized 
the South after the war faced little chal lenge until the 
1970s . Then, revisionists found that continuity 
characterized Jmlch of postwar southern society despite the 
tw:rooil of the 1860s and 1870s . For exairQ?le, Jonathan Wiener 
argued that in Alabana the planter class persevered in its 
control of both land and labor, and in its subordination of 
4 
industrial-commercial interests . Dwight Bil lings found 
ccntinuity in North carolina, but argued that planters did 
not oppose industrial develor;ment as a threat to their own 
hegeroony .  Instead , they ccntrolled and directed the 
"industrial revoluticn" in the South. 3 
My research indicates that Knoxvil le's business-civic 
leaders in the late nineteenth century mirrored the class 
described by Woodward and others . A diverse group of 
praninent , influential and ambitious businessmen and 
professionals led Knoxvil le in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries . These aspiring business-civic leaders 
sb;lred a camd. tment to industrial-commercial 
the surest path to Knoxville's prosperity. 
develor;ment as 
Whether or not 
such leadership narked a significant change fran the past , 
however, is not the focus of this study. Instead, it 
examines the business-civic community wel l after the 
imnediate postwar period. By the late nineteenth century, 
these business-oriented Knoxvil l ians already had established 
3 C.  Vmm Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913'­
vol . 9 in A History of the South..L eds ., Wendel l Holmes 
Stephenson and E.  Merton coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana state 
University Press , 1951) ;  Jonathan Wiener , Social Origins ot 
tbe New South: Alabana, 1860-1880 _ (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State Oni versi ty Press , 1978) ;  Dwight B .  Bil lings, Jr . , 
Planters and the Making of a "New South:" Class. Politics and 
Develapnent in North carolina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hil l : 
University of North Carolina Press , 1979) ;  Don H.  Doyle,  New 
Men. New Cities. New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, 
Mobile. 1860-1910 (Chapel Hill :  University of North Carolina 
Press , 1990) , x-xiii . 
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a consistent leadership role in Knoxville.  4 
In New Men, New Cities, New South, Don H. Doyle argues 
that only a few urban histories of the region focus on New 
South cities , and even fewer examine the businessmen who 
daninated urban society in the postwar South. Doyle argues 
that although the urban business class had a prani.nent role 
in shaping the JOOdem South, its influence varied fran city 
to city . He argues that the actual process of 
"city-building" forged a business class with canoon goals 
for the "cities , the region and themselves . "  My study 
suggests , however, that despite this consensus for 
industrial-commercial expansion, Knoxville's  business-civic 
canmmi ty remained divided . As a result ,  business-boosters 
proved incapable of naintaining a consensus behind important 
developnental 5 schemes . 
In 'l!le New South creed: A study in Southem MytlmlJd.ng , 
Paul M. Gaston writes that ''with bountiful resources , 
confidence in the acquistion of capital , and faith that 
labor adequate to develop the region would be attracted, New 
South prophets . . .  envisioned a balanced, diversified, dynamic 
econany that would produce incalculable riches . "  The irony 
in the New South creed, however, as Gaston sees it , is that 
4 Michael McDonald and Bruce Wheeler, Knoxville. 
'l'ennessee: Continuity and Change in an Appalachian City 
(Knoxville:  university of Tennessee Press , 1983). 
5 Doyle,  xiii . 
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although the image of the rrcdernized SOUth remained powerful 
and persuasive, it actually became a hol low shibboleth: 
''Unable to bequeath to the next generation of Southerners a 
legacy of solid achievement, the New South spokesmen gave 
them instead a solidly propounded and widely spread image of 
its success, a mythic view of their own times that was as 
rem::wed fran objective reality as the myth of the Old 
South. "  New South boosters lauded southern econani.c 
"success" even as poverty and econani.c stagnation continued 
to trouble much of the region. 6 
Several scholars have sought to explain why poverty 
persisted in the South, and why the econCIJU' failed to 
ful fil l  the exaggerated predictions of New South boosters . 
In Old South, !few South, Gavin Wright argues that regardless 
of booster rhetoric ,  southern employers tried to restrict 
the influx of outside capital and industry into the region 
in order to protect low-wage standards in the South. Letting 
in industry that paid higher wages carm:m to other regions 
of the country would spark the labor CCJ11Petition and wage 
increases that southern industrial and agricultural 
enployers wanted to avoid. Thus , while boosters proclaimed 
that industrialization would bring prosperity to al l , the 
South remained a poverty-stricken and 1 ow-wage region wel l 
6 Paul M. Gaston, The Hew South Creed: 
SoutheJ:n Myth1aki.ng _ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 
109 .  
A stydy 
1970) , 
in. 
78 , 
7 
into the twentieth century. 7 
In SoutheJ:n Tradi tian and Regiaoal Progress , Wi l liam 
Nichol ls found a 100re traditional explanation for the 
South' s  econanic problems .  He argued that southern 
tradi tians i.n'peded econanic progress . The region' s  
!)agrarianism, 2 )rigid social structure, 3)unclsoocratic 
political structure, 4) lack of social respansibili ty, 
a tradition of intellectual and behavioral confotmi ty 
and 5) 
prevented the southern econany fran sufficiently " -.. -�.:-­eA�IU.UAO:I I 
diversifying, and industrializing" to solve the persistent 
problem of southern poverty . 8 
My study localizes the search to identify what hindered 
the South' s  econanic advancement . In the late nineteenth 
century, Knoxville's boosters believed that any disagreement 
with their plans for development threatened the city ' s  
prosperity. If  such dissent actually dmraged Knoxville's  
econanic potential , however, the boosters therrsel ves must 
share the blame. Knoxville's  business-civic 
that prosperity lay in industrial-cannercial 
1 eaders agreed 
developnent , 
and that political and social discord threatened efforts to 
7 Gavin Wright , Old South . Kew South: Revolutiaos in the 
SoutheJ:n Eccmanr Since the Civil war (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc . , 1986) , 270 ; James c. Cobb, ' 'Making  Sense of Econani.c 
History, "  i'be Georgia Historical Quarterly _ LXXI (Spring 1987 ): 
8 Wil liam B. Nichol ls, Southem Tradition and Regional _ 
Progress (Chapel Hill : University of North carolina Press , 
1960 ) .  
8 
attract capital and industry . Yet , local political bickering 
and factionalism among business-boosters undetmi.ned any 
irre.ge of consensus they hoped to mrlntain. The dislmi ty that 
characterized Knoxville's  business-civic carmmity 11BY have 
contributed to the city ' s  failure to achieve the level of 
prosperity enjoyed by Nashvil le, Chattanooga and Atlanta. In 
this sense, I1U" study suggests a partial explanation, in 
microcosm, for the persistent sluggishness and backwardness 
of the southern postwar econany . 
Part <k1e of this thesis demonstrates that Knoxvil le 's  
boosters believed that a social consensus behind their 
schemes and programs was crucial to attracting new industry 
successfully.  A subsidy election held in 1887 to subscribe 
public m:mey to two new railroads illustrates that 
business-civic boosters were detetmined to establish at 
least the appearance of harm:my to facilitate their 
recruitment efforts . Throughout the subsidy carr;»aign, 
boosters stressed the in;x)rtance of diminishing the 
visibility of dissent expressed towards the subsidy 
propositions . Local newspapers called for enthusiastic 
supporters to convince those inclined to vote against 
propositions to refrain fran voting at al l .  For 
business-civic leaders convinced of the al l-const.mi.ng 
public 
the 
necessity of recruiting industry and investment fran outside 
the canmmi ty , the appearance of a social consensus 
9 
outweighed the i.Jrportance of dissent as a "quality-check" on 
the efficacy of certain schemes . 
The stiff catp!tition of hundreds of other southern 
canrunities looking to prosper by the same methods led 
business-civic boosters to E!IJt)hasize the less obvious 
advantages their camami ty offered to any prospective 
investor. In Knoxville,  like many other towns , boosters 
stressed the city's  al leged social and political hal:naly . 
They hoped that a camumi ty that "un.a:n:i.roousl y" supported al l 
methods of fostering industrial-cannercial prosperity would 
pranise enough political , econanic and social stability to 
attract outside capital . Despite thei;- exaggerations , 
however , boosters clearly recognized that Knoxvil lians did 
not agree lm8l'liioously to much of anything. Their appeals to 
black citizens , the white working-class , rural citizens and 
wealthy conservatives during the subsidy election suggested 
that they believed these groups were likely to oppose the 
propositions . 
Part Two of this thesis 
the 1890s in order to expand 
examines political conflict 
our tmderstanding of the 
divisions that persisted in spite of the developnental 
consensus . The municipal controversies of 1893 and 1894 
in 
appear to be typical of public issues daninating local 
headlines throughout the era . As a rapidly expanding city , a 
growing demand for urban services plagued city leaders 
struggling to roodernize 
believed that inproved 
10 
a limited infrastructure. 
urban amenities, such as 
Boosters 
transportation and utilities , attracted investors while a 
deteriorating city repel led them. Thus, nn.micipal schemes 
became central to the efforts of Knoxville's  pramters; 
however , such schemes also often provoked opposition .  By 
examining the controversies surrounding the Knoxvi 11  e Water 
Cclrg;)any and the Knoxville,  CUmberland Gap and Louisvil l e  
Railroad schemes in 1893 and 1894 , I hoped to detetmine who 
opposed these schemes, why they were against them, and if 
such opposition was related to statewide factions and 
politics . 
In Bourbc:ms, Redeaners and Populists, Roger Hart 
examines the political tunooil that characterized statewide 
politics in Tennessee in the late nineteenth century . He 
finds that this discord reflected a carpetition for social 
status within the social order rather than a battle of 
econani.c interests arrayed against it . He defines these 
status groups vying for statewide power as defensive versus 
optimist . The fomer were general ly previous secessionists 
whose experience of Civil War defeat rendered them incapable 
of sharing in the general "l\merican 100od of optimism . "  The 
latter group, conversely,  were those who could forget the 
war and rrove on to help create a better South, or those for 
whan the Union victory vindicated their opposition to the 
11 
Confederacy . In addition, Hart finds that shifting factions 
and coalitions disrupted the Deroocratic party at this time, 
while localism pervaded Tennessee politics overal l .  9 
My study agrees in sare respects with Hart 's  
conclusions . For exaJ11?le, businessmen and professionals with 
business interests , ranging fran snal l merchants to large 
industrialists or capitalists , participated on both sides of 
the numicipal controversies of 1893 and 1894 . Thus , the 
discord that arose over numicipal issues does not appear 
refl ect clashing econanic interests within the 
business-civic camamity . Personal factions existed in 
Knoxville  although to a 100re 
various elections throughout 
"generational" factionalism 
limited extent, as seen in 
the era and in the apparent 
moong sare Daoocrats . However , 
to 
these local factions do not appear to be related to those on 
the statewide 1 evel , including the faction 1 ed by 
Knoxvillian John c. Houk . Knoxvil lians ,  of course, were 
conscious of state activities ,  events and rivalries, but 
they do not seem to have defined local positions by 
state-level politics . 
Hart ' s  optimist-defensive political dichotamf does not 
hold true in Knoxville within the parameters of this study . 
9 J .  Eugene Lewis , "The Tennessee Gubematorial Caiq;>aign 
and Election of 1894, "  Tennessee Historical Quarterl y _ xiii 
( June 1954) , 99-126; Roger L .  Hart , Redeemers . Bourbons an4. 
Populists: Temlessee, 1870-1896 _ (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press , 1975) .  
12 
Political controversy in the election campaign of 1893-4 
appeared to be among business-civic: leaders who shared an 
essential ly optindstic: view of the c:i ty ' s  potential . In 
other words , the members of both sides were boosters , and as 
such, expressed a positive faith in industrial-c:cmnerc:ial 
developnent as the pathway to progress . Although significant 
discord occurred within this c:anmmi ty, it does not appear 
to be a division between those Knoxvil lians with a negative 
view of the urban-industrial future versus those who thrived 
in that environment .  
The support of Knoxville's  boosters in 1887 for the 
subsidy propositions had the appearance of a consensus, if 
not in the c:amnmity as a whole,  then at l east among 
business-civic: leaders . The rmmic:ipal controversies of 1893 
and 1894, however , reveal that a very significant source of 
discord lay I'IUClh closer to bane . 
In 1893 , the Knoxville Water CCI'I'Pany(KWC) asked the 
c:ity for permission to issue $750 ,000 in bonds to upgrade 
the waterworks system. In the same year, the Knoxvil le,  
Ct.lnberland Gap and Louisville Railroad{Kro&L) , fotmerly the 
Powel l ' s Val ley Railroad involved in the 1887 subsidy 
election, derranded that the c:ity pay the $225 , 000 prani.sed 
to the railroad in 1887 . Business leaders and government 
officials general ly agreed that an inproved water system and 
new railroad connections were in;lortant to the city ' s  
13 
industrial-cannercial progress . Yet , they soon split over 
whether the city should meet these corporate requests . 10 
The support of a najority of the city council for the 
RWC and :K.CD&L proposals incensed sane business-civic 
leaders . They believed that a desire for personal profit and 
political ambitions explained why these city officials would 
back schemes that a significant portion of the business 
camumity deemed unwise. These disgruntled citizens cal led 
t.hem9el ves the "progressive" business element ,  but labeled 
the members of the city council "clique" as mere "ward 
politicians" 
advancement . 
primarily carmitted to personal and party 
In fact , both sides were quite similar . 
Industrialists , capitalists , merchants, snall businessmen, 
and lawyers carprised those who both supported and opposed 
the corporate schemes . In addition, many of those on each 
side were boosters as wel l .  Despite these camv:malities , 
however , Knoxville�s business-civic community proved unable 
to resolve these controversies hatmmiously. 
The nu.micipal election of 1893-4 reveals sanething of 
the nature of this dispute because these controversies 
became central to the campaigning of both Deroocrats and 
Republicans . On the surface the dispute might be dismissed 
of the rmmicipal controbersies is 10 The above discussion 
a synthesis of inforrre.tion 
and Journal over a period 
For specific references , 
this study. 
published in the Knoxville Sentinel 
of several roonths in 1893 and 1894. 
see Part TWo , ' 'Division Instead, "  of 
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as si.Jrple Democratic versus Republican rivalry. In addition, 
personal factionalism perhaps explains why sane Democrats 
chose one side over another. However, as the c�aign 
proceeded, both parties adopted anti -ring and pro-reform 
rhetoric . This suggests that a measure of general discontent 
with city leadership characterized a portion of :Knoxville's  
business-civic ccmmmity. 
Opposition to the numicipal schemes refl ected a concern 
that the RHC and the KCX;&L proposals would saddle the city 
with mwanted and mwise debt . The national depression 
plaguing the CO\Ultry at the time probably heightened this 
concern . Refoilll'"11li.nded Knoxvil lians believed that corruption 
threatened the city's  "progress" and developnent because it 
led sane city officials to back questionable municipal 
schemes . The solution, in their view, was to oust the city 
CO\Ulcil "clique" fran office and replace it with a body of 
experienced, wise and honest businessmen cannitted first and 
last to the city ' s  overal l progress. Thus ,  the election of 
1894 became a battleground between two groups of 
business-boosters whose cannitment to developnent failed to 
mite them behind i.Jrportant develq:mental schemes . 
As Michael McDonald and Bruce Wheeler have noted, 
political progressivism fotmally reared its head in 
Knoxville  around 1910 as sane citizens pushed for the city 
camdssion form of govemment . They hoped to instil l  
15 
''business-like efficiency and honesty" in government by 
replaciz)g the rrayor and aldermen with five camdssioners 
elected at-large and assigned seperate responsibilities . 
The 1893-4 canpaign and election perhaps shows the earlier 
roots of this movement , dubbed ''business progressivism" by 
George B.  Tindall , as refocn-mi.nded Knoxvil lians in the 
1890s similarly canv?aigned for a non-partisan and 
business-oriented city council .  11 
In 1887 , boosters saw certain Knoxvil lians outside of 
the business-civic ccmmmity as the citizens roost likely to 
oppose the railroad subsidies . In 1893, however, boosters 
disagreed among themselves over the numicipal schemes . A 
political consensus behind booster plans rray have seemed 
extremely l.Jrportant in recruiting capital successful ly, but 
Knoxvi l l e ' s  praooters were unable to draw on such a 
consensus when discord characterized the business-civic 
canmmi ty itself .  
In The Urban Ethos ,  Blaine Brownel l examines the 
consensus for econanic development and social order that 
developed among the mostly white cannercial-civic elite in 
southern cities by the 1920s . The "urban ethos , "  Brownel l 
argues , consisted of "a general overarching conception of 
11McDonald and Wheeler ,  41-48; George Brown Tindal l ,  The 
&nerqence of the New South, 1913-194S.c... vol . 10 in A History ot 
the South..L eds . , Wendel l Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton 
Coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State university Press , 1967 ) , 
219-253 . 
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the city which stressed the desirability---indeed, the 
necessity---of both urban growth and social order in such a 
way that they would be mutual ly reinforcing" . 12 
My study of Knoxville fol lows Brownell in the sense 
that a consensus for econani.c developnent and 
industrial-commercial prosperity existed aJOOng the city's  
commercial-civic leaders . However, in the late nineteenth 
century in Knoxvil le,  this develaping consensus did not 
guarantee political accord on key municipal and political 
issues . Such an "urban ethos" strong enough to produce 
consistent political harroony may have developed aJOOng 
Knoxville's  business-civic leaders by the 1920s . At the turn 
of the century, however, local political bickering and 
factionalism divided Knoxville's leadership , and l.Uldetmined 
efforts to pranote an image of lmity as a key element of the 
development effort . 
12Blaine A. Brownel l ,  The Urban Ethos in the South. 
1930 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press , 
xix. 
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Ccmnanding with her rail roads and river 
camamications the cannerce of a large extent of 
cotmtry broader than the boasted kingdans of the 
Old World, rich in all the varied prcxfucts, 
whether fran the mines ,  the orchards, the meadows, 
the gardens, the fiel.cfs or the forests, of all 
the fair lands the � ever shone upon, this is 
one of the fairest . 
To nany citizens at the tum of the century, Knoxville  
perched on the edge of ful l-blown status as a prospering 
New South city. Despite the bustle and hum of industrial 
activity, however, same citizens complained that Knoxville 
advanced too slowly. Although proud of the city' s  
accomplishments , a group of ambitious white businessmen and 
professionals dreamed of 1 eading a "progressive" Knoxville  
to natch the prosperity of Atlanta and Nashville.  Attracting 
new industrial investment stood as a cornerstone in the 
booster plan for progress . 
New South boosters emerged fran an expanding 
industrial -commercial sector. Business proprietors ranging 
fran large wholesale grocers to industrial and financial 
nagnates to successful professionals led the rrovement for 
13 'ftle Mineral and Aqricul tural Resources 
'l'ennPMee • • •  Knoxville: '.l!le Camercial Center and 
B�Roriun and the Pittsburgh of the New South: An 
Review (Knoxvil le,  TN . : Chronicle Co. , 1883) , 21 . 
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industrial prosperity. Based on memberships in various 
pranotional associations ,  Knoxville spawned its own clan of 
New SOuth boosters. 14 
Both before and after the turn of the century, 
:Knoxvil l e's pranoters numbered praninently within the 
upper-middle to upper class . Most were large scale,  
prosperous wholesale, retail and industrial proprietors , 
financial nagnates or praninent professionals .  Booster 
investments reflected diverse business activities , and both 
commercial and industrial proprietors sought to speed along 
:Knoxvi 1 1  e '  s econanic developnent . Boosters hailing fran 
outside the region as wel l as natives of both Knoxville  and 
Tennessee belonged to a variety of pranotional 
organizations .  For exatl'(>le,  J .c. Luttrel l ,  described in 1889 
as one of :Knoxville's  "best and roost pushing citizens" , 
14McDonald and Wheeler ,  18 ; In Origins of the New South, _ 
C.  Vann Woodward first identified an ascendant postwar 
commercial and industrial middle-class vying with a greatly 
weakened plantation aristocracy for control of the southern 
econany. He believed that urban boosters represented new 
values , rranners and institutions ,  and eventual ly eclipsed the 
power of aristocratic landowners . For different perspectives , 
see Jonathan M .  Wiener , Social Origins.:_ Dwight Bil lings , 
Planters; Gavin Wright , The Political Fcmaqy of the Cotton_ 
South: Households, Markets and Wealth in the Nineteenth 
Century {New York: W .W. Norton, 1978) ;  James c. Cobb, 
Industrializaticn and Sout:hem Society, 1877-1984 _ (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1984) ; In New Men, Don H .  
Doyle argues that postwar boosters represented a wealthier 
segment of southern white society. New South boosters rose 
fran the "middling levels" through expanded opport\mities in 
cannerce, manufacturing and transportation to assume leading 
roles in the business camumity. 
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became a large hardware merchant as well  as a real estate 
investor. He served as vice-president of the Ohamber of 
carmerce and fil led two tetmS as mayor. J .  Wiley Brownlee, 
a city aldeman for two tetmS fran 1904-1907 , served on the 
pranotional Appalachian Exposition Board of 1911, and 
canpl eted two tetmS as President of the Board of Trade. He 
organized three textile mills in the 1890s as wel l as a 
local chapter of the Travelers Protective Association, a 
national booster organization. An "industrial spirit" 
nDtivated a diverse and IJDStly upper-class segment of 
l(noxville1s  business carmunity both before and after the 
tum of the century. 15 
Aware that expanding I<noxville1s commercial -industrial 
base required outside capital , boosters touted the rich 
abundance of East Tennessee 1 s natural resources . Camumities 
developed a "flamboyant" pranotional rhetoric, painting a 
glowing and exaggerated portrait of the region 1 s natural 
advantages . One East Tennessean graphical ly described the 
15 Knoxville, Tennessee: A City tJnsectianal am! 
Cosnq?olitan by the Varied Industries of Her People:  Cliirate, 
Scenery and .Mcdem Progress _ (I<noxville,  TN . : I<noxvil le Chamber 
of cannerce, 1889) , 48 . All of the above biographical 
inforrcation can be found in Lucile Deadrick , Heart of th@.. 
Valley: A History of Rnoxville. Tennessee _  (Knoxville,  TN. : 
East Tennessee Historical Society, 1976) ; Mary U.  Rothrock, 
'!'be French Broad-Ralston Cotmtrv: A History of Rnox County, 
Temessee (I<noxville,  TN. : East Tennessee Historical Society, 
1922):  Russel l W .  Hanlon, Men of Affairs in Rnoxville 
(I<noxville,  TN . : Journal and Tribune Publishing Canpany, 
1921) . 
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region's advantages: ''East Tennessee, always beautiful , 
looks like a beautiful bride, with her blue-peaked toountains 
in the background, the soft green leaves , bursting buds , 
bloaning flowers , singing birds , broad fertile val leys . "  
Boosters hoped to draw the avid, even amorous attention of 
northem and foreign capital to Knoxville.  16 
Geography, climate and resources alone,  however , might 
not be enough to attract investors . Hundreds of canmmities 
throughout the South pratDted similar natural features that 
offered any potential investor a choice of many locations . 
Ci. ties and towns bid against each other by offering a 
variety of inducements to woo such investors . 
Improving city services became a favorite goal of 
Knoxvil l e ' s  pratDters who believed that better 
transportation and sewer and water systems would greatly 
facilitate their efforts . Joined by similar canmmities 
throughout the South in a catl)eti tion for capital , boosters 
also enhanced Knoxvi 11 e'  s advantages through an industrial 
recruitment program offering free sites , tax exenptians ,  and 
cash subsidies . Boosters needed popular and govermnental 
cooperation to obtain such inducements . They came to believe 
that inf 1 uencing the course of devel opnent depended on 
maintaining both private and public cooperation among 
16 The Review: A Joumal 
Manufacturing Industries, etc. 
Devoted to Cannerce, 
6 (April 1897} , 84. 
u.; .... .;.,. ... ........ �,-
business proprietors , 
nl.lllber of voters . 17 
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local government and a significant 
Weal thy citizens both in and out of the business 
ccmmmity control led the local investment which many 
industries derranded before cannitting their own capital . 
Governmental decisions and legislation favoring industrial 
such as low property value assessments , tax developnent , 
exE!IIQ?tions , and subsidy appropriations , depended upon the 
support of public officials .  In addition, many of the same 
inducements required a popular referendum. Voters decided if 
cash subsidies or stock subscriptions ,  for example,  became 
part of the booster scheme for industrial devel opnent . As 
wealthy citizens , and often as public officials ,  Knoxville's  
pranoters worked to assemble a successful industrial 
recruitment program by seeking social cohesion above and 
beyond government-booster cooperation. 
In the calq)eti ti ve econanic environment after the Civil 
War, southern boosters feared that public divisions over the 
proper route to econanic developnent could propel a 
potential investor straight into the arl'l\9 of sister towns 
exhibiting a more solid, and thus stable, investment 
climate. They believed that any divisions within the 
business ccmmmity would hinder local invesbnent in 
17 For a discussion concerning the scarcity of capital in 
the postwar South, see Woodward , 107-141 . 
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developnent and damage the appearance of econanic unity and 
stability. In 1910 , Wil liam J .  Oliver 1 a praninent 
industrialist and booster 1 addressed a pranotional banquet 
cal ling for Knoxville's  businessmen to "subordinate their 
prejudices and personal mrbitions to the general upbuilding 
and advancement of Knoxvi l le . "  He exhorted Ccmnercial Club 
II'IE!!II'bers to be of "one mind, of one faith when anything canes 
up that wil l  tend to advance Knoxvil le's  interests . "  In 
Knoxvi l le,  pranoters publicly appealed for business unity, 
and fOlmded organizations like the Chamber of Carmerce, the 
Board of Trade and the cannercial Club to uni. te diverse 
business interests nomal ly divided by free market 
cal;)etition behind a shared goal : Knoxville's  "progressive" 
industrial developnent . 18 
Many trade associations actively pranoted econanic 
developnent . For exarrple, . the Carmercial Club ,  original ly 
organized to advance jobbing int�ests , also raised ten 
thousand dol lars in pranotional funds to pranote Knoxvi 11 e'  s 
first Appalachian Exposition of 1910 , an event aimed at 
pranoting Knoxville's and East Tennessee' s  agricultural and 
industrial resources . Boosters often worked through several 
trade and pranotional organizations at once . Many members of 
the Carmercial Club ,  the Manufacturers and Producers 
18 'l'be Mineral and .nqricul tural Resources of East_ 
Telmessee ,  22 ; The :Knoxvil le Market Annual_ (Knoxville,  TN. : 
The Carmercial Club of Knoxville,  1908) . 
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Association and the Travelers Protective Association also 
belonged to Knoxvil le's  pramtional Board of Trade. 
Boosters directed agendas towards encouraging cooperation 
among Knoxville's  business proprietors . The Board of Trade 
included arrong its broad objectives in 1906 the cannitment 
to "cooperate in business and municipal affairs" as wel l as 
"create 100re civic pride . "  Through promotional associations 
and public appeals for business unity and cooperation, 
boosters hoped to create a consensus behind the chosen 
course of econanic development .  19 
Business cooperation carprised only one of the 
essential carponents needed to foster social cohesion. Most 
inducements , such as stock subscriptions or tax exE!'f1?tions , 
required the cooperation of local public officials ,  and to 
ensure that support Knoxvi 1 1  e' s boosters often ran for 
public office . Throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the rnell'b!rships of the boards of 
aldecnen, city councils and city cannissians prinarily 
financial and reflected mercantil e, wholesale, industrial , 
professional interests , and boosters ntmlbered praninent 1 y on 
local government bodies throughout the period. For exanple, 
several members of the Appalachian Exposition Board of 1910 
sinul taneously filled tenns as city aldecnen. Samuel R. 
19 James T. Grady, Tbe City of Knoxville, Tennessee anq 
Vicinity and "lheir Resources, Illus._ {Knoxville,  TN . : Knox 
Board of Trade, 1906) . 
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Rambo began a te:rm in 1908 and carpleted it with Nathan 
Kuhlman in 1911 . Wil liam Kephart, T .H.  Heald, M. J .  Condon 
and Peter Kem, - all directors an the Chamber of carmerce 
Board in 1896, held various positions in city government 
throughout the period. I<:noxville's  boosters wielded 
political influence as members of the city ' s  prinary 
decision-making 20 bodies . 
In the late 1880s , praooters initiated an exuberant 
public CCIJII)aign to subsidize two new railway lines .The 
prosubsidy caJ'It)aign preceding the election in August of 1887 
illun:i.nated the role local government cooperation could play 
in securing an important inducement . In 1887 , the I<:noxvill e 
Southern and the Powel l ' s Valley railroads applied to the 
city for stock sUbscriptions totaling $500 ,000 . Each company 
pranised to construct standard gauge 1 ines through or near 
Rnoxville within a certain nunber of years in return for the 
subsidies . The nayor and alder:men scheduled an election for 
August 13 for the voting public to decide the fate of the 
proposition. Ordaining the election could have been a 
neutral decision, but local officials clearly favored the 
subscription. The alder:men and nayor appointed and organized 
ward ccmnittees to canvass support and bring in a favorable 
vote . In addi tian to sending out prosubsidy canvassers , 
20 For a listing of members of city government 
period, see Deadrick, 640-645 . 
for the 
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Mayor J .c. Luttrel l, this time with the board of public 
ks 1 · ted "secret pol1' cemen" wor , a so appom al legedly to guard 
the polls against attempted bribery. Ward cann:i.ttees 
subnitted "suitable" security ncmi.nees to the nayor and 
board for approval . Fol lowing a frenzied caJ11i)aign of 
meetings , parades and ral lies, the subsidy propositions 
carried by an overwhelming najori ty . 21 
As the election il lustrated, directing public m:mey 
towards industrial recruitment schemes required the 
cooperation of the general voting public as wel l as business 
proprietors and 1 ocal govermnent .  Knoxvil le's  praooters 
sought wide electoral support in several ways . They hoped to 
encourage prosubsidy support through parades , ral lies , 
meetings and canvassing . On August 6,  1887 , boosters 
sponsored a nass ral ly in support of the railroad subsidies . 
The Daily Sentinel described the event in an article 
entitled "GRAND RALLY; '!'HE YalNG M!lf PAINT ' ER  RED , "  and 
designated it "the biggest kind of railroad jubilee" with an 
estimated participation of five thousand. After a procession 
including narchers , bands ,  narsbals an horseback and ladies 
exhibiting "the greatest enthusiasm concerning the roads , "  
supporters ral lied at the custans-house square to hear 
prosubsidy speakers. The 1 eading orator , Sarmlel G. Heiskell ,  
a leading attorney and a very active Derrocratic politician, 
21 Daily Sentinel 3 August 1887 . 
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declared that , as the crowd indicated, Knoxville sang "one 
grand united hynn to a future that is gladsane and sure . "  22 
In addition to exuberant parades and rallies, boosters 
used local newspapers to appeal for support . Both the 
Knoxville Daily Journal and the Daily Sentinel exhorted 
readers to vote for the subsidies . Many articles and 
editorials claimed that Knoxvillians alroost unanimously 
favored the propositions. Declaring that all people against 
the railroads had left the city, the Daily Sentinel 
proclaimed the election safe for the railroads . In a later 
and similar subsidy election the same year, the Knoxville 
Daily Journal stated that no one who . wanted ' 'Knoxvil le's 
prosperity to increase and its people to becane roore 
prosperous [could] afford to stay away fran the pol ls . "  The 
Daily Sentinel described an incident to ilhmi.nate the 
" apparent dearth of anti -subsidy sentiment : A few days ago a 
jol ly old Ge:man was down fran New Market anned with a 
club . He said that he had cane down to break the head of any 
I<noxvil·le Dutchnan who opposed the railroads , but that he 
couldn ' t  find any . "  23 
In the drive for social and political cohesion, 
boosters appealed directly to particular groups they felt 
22 Daily Sentinel 12 , 6 August 1887 . 
23 Daily Sentinel _ 3 ,  8 August 1887 ; Daily Journal 29 
October 1887 ; Dai 1 y Sentinel 10 August 1887 . 
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might not approve their schemes for "progress . "  Clearly, 
every citizen did not benefit directly or equally fran new 
railroads or industries . 
urban-rural , black-white, 
Boosters appealed across 
and class divisions by E!II'{)hasizing 
the rewards al l would reap fran such investments . 
Boosters appealed for working-class support by linking 
Rnoxville's  prosperity to expanding E!II'{)loyment through 
industrial development . Citing a railroad subsidy as an 
appropriate step to take, pramters claimed that ''The roore 
E!II'{)loyment we can have for labor and capital in Rnoxville 
the roore prosperous it wil l be and the roore rapid its 
growth." Evan Jones , "a laboring man of travel ed experience" 
talked "freely of the blessings to cane fran voting the 
subscriptions" while addressing a meeting to foster 
blue-col lar support . 24 
Appealing to the working-class inc! uded speaking to 
black workers who cali}rised a significant portion of 
railroad and industrial labor. Boosters tied the interests 
of black citizens to development schemes by E!II'{)hasizing 
their role in the industrial sector . Reverend J .  C.  Lawrence, 
pastor of Shi 1 oh Presbyterian Church often spoke at 
pro-subsidy meetings . During a subsidy election in 1889 , he 
stated that he failed " to see how the colored man as a 
laborer and wage eamer could afford to vote against the new 
24 Daily
. 
Journal 8 ,  12 September 1887 . 
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road . "  The participation of black voters in the 1887 
parade indicated support for the propositions am:mg sane 
segments of Knoxville's  black population. 25 
Railroads which appeared to benefit prirrarily urban 
dwel lers seemed to offer intangible rewards to citizens in 
the rural parts of the com1ty . Boosters fol lowed the same 
line in jockeying for rural support as they had when 
appealing to the working-class . According to their argument, 
railroads and the industries they attracted benefited the 
entire camami ty, and thus , rural as wel l as urban citizens 
should support the propositions . As the Daily Sentinel 
graciously declared in 1887 , ' 'Knoxvil le wil l  share the 
benefits to be derived fran the new roads . The prosperity of 
the cO\mty goes hand in hand with the growth and greatness 
of the city . "  Another subsidy election held two years later 
elicited assurances that the railroad would benefit people 
living along the line as well as city-dwellers . Boosters 
tried to link rural , working-class and black interests to 
their schemes . By waging a strong pro-subsidy caJlt)aign 
throughout the city and com1ty, they hoped to convince a 
diverse electorate that al l interests lay with the booster 
vision of econanic "progress . "  26 
25 Daily Sentinel 6 August 1887 ; Daily Journal 
September 1889. 
26 Daily Sentinel 1 November 1887 ; 7 September 1887 . 
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As prosperous and influential citizens often holding 
local public offices , business-civic boosters believed they 
could shape the direction of econanic developnent in 
Knoxville.  SUCcessfully wielding their power, however, 
denanded cooperation among business proprietors , local 
government and a wider electorate. Boosters sought social 
and political cohesion to secure the inducements they 
believed necessary to recruit industrial investment . A 
facade of overwhelming confidence that the subsidy 
propositions would carry did not diminish booster worries 
about the election. They believed negative votes weakened 
their claims that a camumity consensus existed behind the 
railroad scheme. Negative votes indicated disagreement which 
boosters hoped to avoid at al l costs . In case the parades , 
rallies ,  meetings and public appeals failed to inspire 
\.U'lailimrus support , praroters tried to rraintain the 
appearance of unity by urging anti-subsidy voters to stay 
away fran the polls on election day. Prosubsidy writers in 
the Daily Sentinel urged canvassers to approach "every nan 
lmown to be against the railroads and do al l in their power 
to induce him to change his mind and vote for the 
subscriptions; and if that fails try to prevail upon him not 
to vote at al l . " In this way, boosters 
anti-subsidy citizens fran registering 
Failing to achieve it , the appearance 
hoped to prevent 
their opposition. 
of political , econanic 
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and social lmi ty became roore inl>ortant than actual! y 
creating a popular consensus . 27 
The active drive for lmity irr;>lied that lmity did not 
Business-civic leaders believed occur natural ly 
that successfully  
or easily. 
directing the city's  econanic developnent 
depended upon the cooperation of a diverse population. As a 
result ,  business-civic 
sign that Knoxvi 1 1  ians 
1 eaders were very sensitive to any 
did not support their efforts 
wholeheartedly. Boosters often cannented on what they 
sanetimes described as a lack of "progressive" spirit among 
the city's  residents . I<'noxvil lians often disagreed over what 
changes or irr;>rovements the city needed to prosper. Upon the 
establishment of a new cotton mill in the city, the Daily 
Olronicle remarked that "the croakers who [were] always 
ready to proncnmce every irr;>ortant enterprise mere gas work 
[bad] the props knocked fran under them this time . "  28 
In January of 1897 , Knoxville's manufacturers heard 
presentations responding to the query ''How Can Knoxvil le 
Best Pranote her Manufacturing Industries?" While addressing 
the meeting, Howard Karnes designated carQ?etitive freight 
rates as an important factor in attracting new industry. 
Despite the fact that snall er cities successful ! y recruited 
carQ?eting lines , Kames believed "a want of a carQ?eting 
27 Daily Sentinel 8 August 1887 . 
28 Daily Chronicle 2 April 1882 . 
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railroad in a town of this size [indicated] a want of public 
spirit on the part of its citizens . "  This cannent came 
after Knoxvillians voted $500 ,000 to help subsidize new 
rail roads a decade earlier. Yet , in Kames '  view, 
disagreement concerning the desirability of new lines 
hindered the city' s  devel opnent as a prime manufacturing 
center. Another decade later, the Rnoxville Market Annual 
found that despite the ceaseless lmock of opportunity at 
"doors where Energy and Enterprise accord a hearty welcane, "  
others answered with "Ignorance and Apathy [with] no ears 
for the cheering sound . "  29 
While city boosters published a wealth of praootional 
literature outlining their views , Knoxvillians opposed to 
particular schemes of econanic developnent left little 
direct record of their objections .  In addition, 
business-boosters owned, published or edited the major 
newspapers . For exarr()le, the Rnoxvill e  Blue Book of 1894 
lists R.H.  Hart, a business-booster original ly fran 
Chattanooga, as the business rranager and editor of the 
Sentinel , and Republican Wil liam Rule, a prani.nent 
capitalist and booster, as the editor and general rranager of 
the Journal • As participants in the effort to foster social 
cohesion, both newspapers often downplayed dissent over 
29 The Review_ 4 (February 1897 ) , 46; Knoxville Market_ 
Annual . 
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econani.c developnent . Infomation about opposition to the 
schemes , can be gleaned, however, fran what boosters said 
about their opponents . Most objections coalesced into three 
areas : taxation, benefits and the quality of investment . 30 
Taxation carplaints involved interest payments on bonds 
issued to ftmd subscriptions and for eventual overal l 
remuneration. The Daily Sentinel reassured citizens that 
the tax increases needed to pay subsidies would remain 
mmageable: "Never mind the taxes . Don't be frightened of 
your own shadow. They are not going to kill or hurt you. 
You' l l  survive, and your children, if you have any, wil l  
reap the fruits of your labor . "  In September of 1889 , the 
Knoxville Daily Journal admitted that subscribing public 
m::mey to the :Knoxville and Northeastern Railroad required 
increasing the property tax by four to five thousand dol lars 
per annum. Yet , the paper still  claimed that the subsidy 
would decrease the overal l tax burden. Eventually, taxation 
on the new railway, adjacent buildings and a prani.sed blast 
furnace would pay the bonds off as well as cover interest in 
the interim. Despite the prani.se that future revenues would 
cane solely fran new enterprises , Knoxvil lians concerned 
30 The Knoxville Blue Book of Selected Names of Knoxville 
and Suburban Tolms • • •  for the Year Ending 1894.._ (Knoxville,  TN. : 
E.W. Crozier, 1894 ) . 
34 
with taxation worried about imnediate increases . 31 
Cancems over changes in property values also related 
to carplaints over taxation. In 1887 , the Daily Sentinel 
declared that all property owners , including boosters , 
wished to avoid a leap in property values that might cause 
increased assessments and taxes . 
No thoughtful and 1 evel-headed citizen desires an 
over-inflation of the price of city property . A 
nomal and 1 egi tinate advance all desire. Let it 
be steady and solid. We want no wild cat 
speculation and no fool-hardy adventures . 32 
Cmplaints that publicly financed industrial schemes 
produced tax increases indicated an element of dissension 
among Rnoxville's  middle-class taxpayers . Wealthier citizens 
also felt the in'()act of increased taxes , yet the 
mi.ddl e-class were nuch less likely to purchase the bonds 
they helped to f\Dld. Citizens not concerned with property 
values and assessments also worried about potential tax 
increases . One Daily sentinel editorial exhibiting a rare 
anti -subsidy tone protested the inequity of f\Dlding the 
subscription with a uniform tax increase . Taxes hit every 
31Daily sentinel _ 3 August 1887 ; Daily Journal 6 September 
1889. 
32 Daily Sentinel 9 August 1887 . 
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citizen, yet the rich could afford to pay while the poor 
could not . 33 
The exuberant and often professed belief that new 
industry and railroads benefited the entire camami.ty did 
not inspire confidence among all elements of the population. 
One writer addressed the carplaint that while al l citizens 
shared the expense of railroad construction equal ly, the 
lines only benefited those parts of the county through which 
it passed. Denying that an equal burden produced unequal 
rewards , the pro-subscription writer declared that what 
built up one portion of the county relieved the expense in 
another. Another writer discredited the canplaint that 
establishing new industries or railroads with public support 
discriminated against rural areas in favor of urban ones . 
New railroads attracted new industries which employed more 
people: "If Knoxville,  by the upbuilding of such enterprises 
is nade a city of 100 ,000 inbabi tants , its consurr;>tion of 
the products of the farm wil l  be increased 250 per cent . "  34 
Sane citizens questioned the wisdan of public 
investment in industrial schemes . one writer addressed a 
concern that funding a new line in 1889 potentially hindered 
fulfillment of the city ' s  previous cannitment to the 
33 Daily Jotirnal 14 September 1889; Daily Sentinel 3 
August 1887 . 
34 Daily Journal 15 September 1889 . 
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carolina , Knoxvi l le and Western Railroad .  The C. , K. , and W .  
sti l l  awaited CaJl)letion although the city had subsidized 
the line by popular approval in 1887 . The rail road reneged 
on a pranise to begin and caJl)lete the line within a given 
time , so boosters claimed the city had no further obligation 
to the C. , K. , & W .  With clear conscience , Knoxvi l l e  could 
abandon the earlier project in favor of the Knoxvi l l e  and 
Northeastern. One anti-subscription writer, however , 
objected to publicly funding any industrial venture , and 
cited the failure of the Carolina, Knoxvil l e  and Western as 
a prime exalli)le of misguided public invesbnent . capitalists 
involved in the scheme should dispense with seeking public 
support and hmd the subscription themselves . other citizens 
protested issuing bonds to finance railroads :  
One Fel l ow  says he is unal terably apposed to the 
issuance of bonds . He is for the railroads ,  but 
thinks we ought to pay as we go . H!
5 
says there 
wil l  be rascality in handling them. 
Yet , certain middle-class , poor, or rural taxpayers 
CaJl)rised only part of the opposition boosters believed 
hindered econanic "progress . "  Throughout the period, 
promoters attacked the econanic conservatism found aroong 
sane of the city' s  wealthy citizens . SUCh Knoxvil lians were 
far less inclined than boosters to cannit money to new 
35 Daily Sentinel 
September 1889 . 
3 August 1887 ; Daily Journal 15 
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industrial schemes . Kames found Knoxvi l l e  in 1897 to be "a 
town of sane wealth [where] business men [were] 
conservative---it nay be too c::onservati ve. "  Wi l liam J .  
Oliver articulated booster 
conservatives : "Conservatism 
c:ontenpt 
belongs 
for Knoxvil l e ' s  wealthy 
to the nan who has 
money invested in government bonds and only has sufficient 
brains to play ping pong . "  While addressing the Carmerc:ial 
Club banquet in March of 1909 ,  booster E.C.  Mahan claimed 
that :Knoxvil lians who c:arplained about contributing to the 
''betterment" of :Knoxvil l e  seldan gave at al l .  Any dissension 
am:mg voters hurt booster sc:hemes at the pol ls , but weal thy 
opposition hurt rec:rui tment efforts financial ly as wel l .  36 
Despite silrply l abeling suc:h c:arplaints as 
anti-development and anti-progressive , booster statements 
reveal more than one attitude . A negative vote might refl ect 
anxiety c:onc:em:i.ng tax increases and land speculation 
without denying the in'portanc:e of railroads in fostering 
industrial growth . Opposition to particular industrial 
rec:rui tment schemes voiced am:mg certain ndddl e-c:lass , 
or rural taxpayers and weal thy c:onservati ves did not 
poor , 
necessarily indicate total opposition to the booster vision 
of ec:onanic: progress . Rather , carplaints reflected concerns 
with the practical appl ication of certain sc:hemes , an 
individual 's relation to the booster vision, and a real istic: 
36:Knoxvil le Market Annual.r.. "l!le Review_ 6 (April 1897 ) , 84 . 
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assessment of rewards derived fran ventures not directly 
beneficial to everyone. 
Opposition am:mg certain groups did not indicate that 
al l members , or even a majority , opposed either particular 
recruitment schemes or the overal l booster vision of 
progress . SUbsidy propositions general ly carried by an 
overwhelming majority just as boosters predicted. Despite 
efforts to diminish their influence and visibility , however, 
sane Knoxvil lians did oppose booster proposals even if they 
failed to carry the day . Regardless of size or strength, 
dissension worried boosters whose faith in econanic 
developnent depended upon a significant level of social 
cohesion. As mmicipal controversies in the 189os wi l l  
reveal , however , Knoxvi l l e ' s  business-civic l eaders failed 
to keep this shared faith in industrial -carrnercial expansion 
above local political bickering . Agreeing on the 
desirability of econanic development did not guarantee 
business-civic sol idarity behind al l schemes rel ated to 
development . 
39 
PARr 'lWO: DIVISI<If INS'.l'EAD 
40 
PART 'IW): DIVISiaf IMSTFAD 
As the railroad subsidy carr;mgn of 1887 il lustrated, 
not al l Knoxvil lians agreed that subsidizing particular 
railroads with public mmey was essential to the city ' s  
growth and prosperity . Business-civic promoters expected 
anti-subsidy votes to be cast during the election, and they 
did whatever they could to nul lify their effect . Boosters 
often claimed in promotional literature that Knoxvil le was a 
city of harmonious interests , but their own statements 
.belied this appraisal . Knoxvil lians 
one side to every issue of publ ic 
brick-paving contracts generated 
bidding process as wel l  as unfair 
citizens protested the extravagant 
construction while others claimed 
like Knoxvi l l e  needed an in;>roved 
always fotmd trOre 
interest . City 
CCJII)laints about the 
errrpl oyment practices . 
costs of sewer 
that a "progressive" 
sewer system at al l 
than 
Sane 
city 
costs . 
Same business proprietors , fed up with tmlddy, unfil tered 
water, cal led for a city-owned waterworks system. other 
businessmen , however, argued that in;>rovements of the water 
system should be l eft to the private sector . Sane 
business-civic leaders believed that the city should ful fi l l  
a contract with a subsidized rail road by paying the pranised 
stock subscription .  others argued just as vehemently that 
41 
the rail road had l ong ago violated the terrcs of the contract 
which nul l ified the city ' s  obl igation to pay . Despite the 
hopes and assurances of its praooters , like most cities , 
Knoxville rarely exhibited a solid front on anything . 
Knoxvil l e ' s  leaders would have liked every publ ic 
ilrprovement to meet with unanimous approval and speedy 
implementation .  Unfort1mately,  this seldan happened. In 
February of 1893 , the Knoxville Sentinel noted that city 
streets suffered fran neglect and decay . The editors cal led 
for the "unsightly" pavements to be removed "as soon as 
possibl e. " A month later the paper reiterated its pl ea ,  and 
explained why better streets were irrportant . 
That the streets should be speedily paved is an 
al l inportant natter , the longer they renain in 
the present condition, the greater detriment it 
wil l be to Knoxville in keeping people fran caning 
here to locate and keeping capital fran caning 
here for invesbnent , for who can deny the extreme 
disadvan\itpe under which a [badly] paved city 
labors? 
Business and city 1 eaders recognized the inportance of 
good streets to praooting the city . Despite this , however , 
they did not agree on how to ilrprove their condition. The 
exasperated editor of the Sentinel declared that ''Knoxvil le 
is no sooner out of one municipal row than she is in 
another . Since the beginning of the truce in regard to the 
water works , the sewer and brick paving questions have 
37 Knoxvi 1 1  e Sentinel 1 February; 1 March 1893 . 
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becane l'l¥)re praninent and are proving fruitful sources of 
discord. " "Poor Knoxville!  1 "  the Sentinel lamented, ''The 
city is feeling the effects of this lack of unanimity on the 
part of the city guardians • • •  Wil l  the public stand it 
long?" "The whole life of our people, business and social , "  
adroonished the Journal editor, "is divided into little 
cliques . • .  Instead of banding together for attack we divide 
into little groups . To attract investors , boosters described 
Knoxville  as a city of diverse but ha!:monious interests . 
More often than harm:m.y,  however, discord characterized the 
scene in Knoxvil le. 38 
Several numicipal controversies daninating 1 ocal 
headlines in 1893 and 1894 revealed a sorely divided 
business-civic community. Knoxville's leadership split when 
trying to detetmi.ne a position for the city regarding 
disputes with the Knoxville Water Canpany (RWC) and the 
Knoxville,  C\mlberland Gap and Louisvil le Railroad (KOJ&L) . 
In 1887 , boosters had worried that negative votes cast by 
rural ,  black, or working-class citizens or weal thy 
conservatives would darrage Knoxville's "reputation" as a 
lmified, stable and accanodating industrial-commercial 
camamity. In 18931 dissent over nunicipal schemes emmated 
38 For l'l¥)re infomation concerning disputes among 
business-civic leaders in the South, especial ly over municipal 
issues, see Don H.  Doyle, New Men; Carl V. Harris , Political 
Power in Binninqham, 1871-1921 _ (Knoxvil le, TN . : University of 
Tennessee Press , 1977 ) .  
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not fran "non-boosters" alone, but fran anv:mg business-civic 
leaders themselves . A najority of city council aldermen, 
roostly businessmen and boosters themselves , favored the 
corporate interest in these schemes , much to the disnay of 
those who labeled themselves the "progressive11 business 
element of the camamity. 39 
on July 1 ,  1882 , the city of Rnoxville signed a 
contract that granted an exclusive, thirty-year franchise to 
the newly-established Knoxville Water Canpany, reserving the 
right to purchase the utility at the eiui of fifteen years . 
In 1892 , H .M. Branson published a pranotional pmrphlet that 
described the advantages of Knoxville and East Termessee in 
sane detail ,  including the "progressive .. state of municipal 
services in the city. Although he describes East Termessee 's 
abl.mdant and beautiful streams and rivers, perfect for water 
power, he neglects to mention anything about the city water 
supply.  In 1890 , George W.  Englehardt renarked in another 
publication on Knoxville that "an aJ'li)le and wholesane water 
supply is everywhere a desideratum of ilrportance in respect 
of the general welfare; quite as inportant with regard to 
the public health as it is for fire protection ,  or as a 
39 For this study, "progressive, "  broadly speaking, means 
pro-development , but specifical ly means favoring local city 
govemment nm by business principles rather than the demands 
of party patronage and political ani)itions . Knoxville Sentinel 
26 January; 1 ,  22 February 1893; Knoxvil le Journal 11 
February; 27 March 1893 . 
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business facility . "  He then noted that the Knoxville Water 
cat;>any provided the city with "a quantity equal to present 
denands . "  Indeed, water fran the Tennessee River and 
reservoir reached Knoxville "direct fran the living springs 
of the roountains , in al l its original purity, uncontaminated 
by the waste of any settlement higher up ,  large or 
snell . "  40 
Despite these assurances , carplaints concerning high 
rates , an inadequate and poor water supply,  and weak water 
pressure plagued the RNC fran the very beginning .  Popular 
dissatisfaction with the carpany culminated in 1893 with a 
rrovement to obtain a publicly-owned waterworks system. On 
January 25 , 1893 Knoxville alderman James P .  Kennedy 
subnitted an act to the city cmmcil requesting the state 
legislature "to authorize the board of nayor and aldermen of 
the city of Knoxvi 1 1  e to issue bonds for water works , to 
acquire and condenn lands necessary therefore, and [to 
create] a board of water work trustees , and prescribing 
rules for its government . "  The support for city ownership 
that emerged deroonstrated that few Knoxvi 1 1  ians agreed with 
Branson' s  and Englehardt ' s  rosy appraisal of the 
40 H .M. Branson, The Annual Handbook of Knoxville, _ 
Teonessee for the Year 1892 (Knoxvil le ,  'm . : Tribune Job 
Office, 1892) , 5 ,  12 ; George W.  Englehardt , Knoxville. 
Tennessee, The Englehardt Series : !merican Cities . (St .  Louis , 
MO. : George W .  Englehardt , armmd 1892-1893) ,  15-16 .  
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privately-owned municipal water system. 41 
Several canplaints l.Ulderlay popular dissatisfaction 
with the service provided by the Knoxville Water carc>any. 
The proprietors of Shields Brothers , wholesale dealers in 
groceries , tobacco and cigars , favored city ownership 
because the Knoxville Water Canpany provided low quality 
water: "If the water canpany has to nake a living sane way 
let them start a hash house with the dead fish, water snakes 
and other reptiles which are so constantly found in the 
reservoir. "  
"aquarium" 
In their opinion, Knoxvil l e  hardly needed an 
for a reservoir. W.P.  King of Bayless , King and 
cruze, manufacturers of stoves , rang� , £unlaces , tinware, 
roofing, et cetera, believed that the canpany should provide 
nDre water of a better quality as pran:i.sed l.Ulder the current 
contract . For this reason, he favored city ownership over 
signing a new contract with the ccrrpany.  Proprietors 
callaway and Brown, dealers in shoes , bats , valises and 
41 Dudley E.  Brewer, A Bi.story of the Knoxville Utilities 
Boaxd: City of Rnoxville. Temessee _ (Knoxville,  TN. : The 
Knoxville Util ities Board, 1979) ,  28-30 . The Knoxvil le Water 
�Y was incorporated in 1882 with a eapi tal stock of 
$250 ,000 . The Utility ptUDped water fran the Termessee River 
just above the city. Goodspeed' s  Bi.storv of Hamilton, Knox anq 
Shelby Cmmties of 'l'amessee _  (Nashvil le,  TN . :  Charles and 
Randy Elder, Booksel lers , 1887 , 1974) , 875. The act offered by 
Aldennan James P.  Kennedy cal led for issuing $400 ,000 in bonds 
to obtain city-owned waterworks . Knoxvil le Sentinel 26 January 
1893 . 
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tnmks , hoped that city ownership would bring cheaper 
rates . 42 
According to the Knoxville Journal , the city needed 
five million gallons of water in addition to what it 
currently received fran the catq?any. The editors later 
described the RWC's service as "incaT�?lete, insufficient and 
often unwholesane . "  One anonymous proprietor whose business 
consuned large amounts of water opposed granting further 
privileges to the I<WC because "their rates are exorbitant 
and their policy is opposed to ideas of progressiveness . "  He 
wanted the city to own the waterworks and charge rates that 
only covered operation and interest on the bonds ,  and 
nothing more. 43 
SUch criticisms stung, and JOrlC officials wasted little 
time before responding to Kennedy's chal lenge of the 
CaT�?any' s  exclusive m:mopoly over the local water supply.  
Through Aldeman George W.  cal lahan, the CaT�?anY offered its 
own proposal for inproving the current util ity, requesting 
permission to issue $750 ,000 in bonds to increase and 
upgrade the facilities . Controversy simnered as the city 
council split between those who favored the RWC' s  proposal 
and those who wanted city ownership. 
Aldermen Sa!mlel A. Bailey, George W.  cal lahan, James P. 
42 Knoxville Sentinel 26 January; 2 ,  22 February 1893 . 
43 Knoxville Journal 11 February 1893 . 
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Kennedy, Gregory J .  Ashe, Matthew M. Nelson and Richard J .  
Jarnagin favored the RWC ordinance. The ItDSt vocal 
supporter , aldeman Cal lahan, vehemently stttrped for the I<WC 
proposal , arguing that ownership of the waterworks system 
would overburden the city with debt . Mayor Tharpson, 
however, along with aldermen A.G. Payne and Benjamin S .  
Boyd, favored city ownership, and the Mayor vowed to veto 
the Knoxvil le Water �Y ordinance if the city council 
passed it . To many, the waterworks controversy ''has becane 
a lmiversal topic of conversation and it is regarded by many 
as the JOOSt in'portant natter of public interest which has 
ever arisen. "  44 
Knoxville 's  business-civic community essentially split 
over the waterworks question. The cat�X)sition of both the 
supporters of and the opposition to the Knoxville Water 
Cmpany was essential ! y the same . Aldetmen on both sides 
were businessmen and/or professionals with business 
interests . George w .  cal lahan, for exaJ'Ii)le,  the al leged 
"ringleader" of the pro-I<WC clique on city council ,  was 
president of Cal lahan Construction Canpany and proprietor of 
George W .  Cal lahan and Bros . , narble contractors . One 
biographical account praised him for having the ''business 
44 The nain point 
by the water CCI1;)an.Y 
bonds to upgrade the 
1893 . 
of contention with the proposal offered 
was the provision to issue $750 ,000 in 
system. Knoxville Sentinel _ 11 February 
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sagacity of a Pennsylvanian and the congeniality and 
polished manners of the typical southern gentlemen. " His 
other business activities included a seat on the board of 
directors for the City National Bank, and ownership of a 
very large (in local terms) and very fertile plantation in 
the county. James P.  Kennedy was a druggist associated with 
Stephenson Manufacturing Co. , manufacturer of drugs and 
essences . Gregory J .  Ashe was a liquor wholesaler , and 
Richard J .  Jarnagin, a butcher, was associated with a meat 
narket and grocery. 45 
On the other side, inC1Mibent Mayor Mel vil le Thati)Son, 
outspoken opponent of the I<HC, began his business career as 
a teamster, and then entered the livery business . This line 
of work proved so successful that Tharpson retired after 
only ten years . Known as a real estate agent and large 
property owner, Mayor Tharpson' s "judgement , business tact , 
and faith in the city's future, applied whenever the golden 
opportunity offered, have secured him an 8l'I'Ple sharing of 
its enhancing realty . "  And aldeman A.G. Payne was a clerk 
with J .E.  Lutz and Co . , retailer of shoes and hats . Thus , 
the occupational carpositians of both sides in this 
45 Men of Affairs 
Baker and Stuart Towe 
1891-2 ; 1893 i 1894 0 
in Knoxville 
[1917] , 33) ;  
(Knoxville,  TN . : Joel L.  
:Knoxvil le City Directory _ 
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controversy, despite their disagreement ,  
different . 46 
were not markedly 
other businessmen besides those an the city council 
soon spoke out against the RrJC ordinance. As an organizatian 
of local business proprietors aimed at pranoting the city, 
the Chanb!r of cannerce took the developing controversy 
quite seriously, and called a meeting to gauge popular 
opinion. The easuing discussion revealed significant 
opposition to the RWC ordinance not only in city council , 
but am:mg Knoxville's businessmen as well .  To further test 
public opinion, the Cba.lliler decided to cal l a mass meeting 
of citizens for February 19 to address the issue. 47 
When citizens assenbl ed in City Hall for the mass 
meeting, the Joumal rerrarked the next day that the familiar 
faces of ''well known and prani.nent business men" fil led the 
meeting. In fact, "the majority of the wealth of the city 
was represented. "  The Sentinel labelled the gathering an 
"indignation meeting" because l!llllhatic applause and hearty 
cheers met each person who spoke against the proposal • 
Participants applauded when W.L. Welcker, an established 
private attorney, denounced the ordinance and declared that 
"the kid council had just as well get in the way of a drove 
of runaway 1111les as to oppose public sentiment . If they 
46 Englehardt , 14-15 . 
47 :Knoxvil l e  Sentinel ll February 1893 . 
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opposed the wishes of their constituents wham they were 
elected to represent , they would never 100re be heard of 
political ly. " Welcker later advised citizens to "drink beer 
and whiskey" rather than accept another unfavorable water 
contract . Both meetings further illustrate that while sane 
businessmen supported the ordinance, an increasingly vocal 
n\Dilber did not . 48 
Knoxville's  business-civic community s�larly split 
over another municipal dispute that embroiled city leaders 
when the Rnoxvil l  e, cumberland Gap and Louisvi 11 e rai 1 road 
(KOO&L) filed suit against the city of Knoxvil le in 1893 . 
The roots of this quarrel dated back to the subsidy election 
of 1887 when Rnoxvil lians approved the public subscription 
of $225 ,000 to the capital stock of the Knoxville,  
C\.lnberland Gap and Louisvil le railroad (then named the 
Powel l ' s Val ley) . In return, the railroad c�y pranised 
to build a line within one mile of the city within 
48 The report of the Chamber carmittee on the Knoxville 
Water Ccrrv?any' s ordinance addressed several points of 
contention. For exatrple,  the RWC preamble stated that the need 
of the city for an increased water supply demanded an enlarged 
capacity, but failed to prove whether or not the cat;)any had 
canplied with the original contract to supply two mil lion 
gal lons of water per day to the city . The carmittee 
disapproved of issuing $750 , 000 in bonds when, according to an 
earlier study, "the honest expenditure of $300 ,000 would give 
the city a water plant sufficient in capacity as to afford 
curple supply of potable water. "  For further details , see 
Knoxvil le Sentinel _ 20 February; 20 March 1893 ; Knoxville 
Journal 19 February 1893 . 
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twenty-four months . 49 
The new line connected Knoxville  to the Louisvil le  and 
Nashvil le railroad at Middlesboro , Kentucky, a "boaning" 
town in 1889. Middlesboro's boan, however , soon petered out 1 
and feeling the effects of the city's  decline, The KOO&L 
railroad entered bankruptcy in 1892 . A booster pamphlet 
published the same year noted that the KOO&L had been "of 
very great service already to Knoxvil le.  It  [made] a modem 
highway of steel of the old trail at CI.Dnberland Gap 1 which 
[had] been used for a century as a wagon road. "  However , 
many attitudes changed a year later when the railroad 
cCI'fi)any fi 1 eel suit in chancery court to force the city of 
Knoxville to pay the $225 1000 it had original ly pran:i.sed to 
subscribe. Initial ly,  some city officials argued that the 
railroad's failure to CCI'fi>lY with the original contract 
nul lified the city' s  obligation. Nevertheless , Chancel lor 
Henry R.  Gibson ruled in favor of the railroad and against 
the city. The board of mayor and alder:men appealed the 
decision to the state supreme court . 50 
As with the Knoxvil le Water Cafl)any, the controversy 
49 For specific details on the history 
dispute with the Knoxville,  CUmberland Gap 
Railroad, see William Rule, standard History 
Temlessee . • •  Down to the Present Time (Chicago: 
of the city ' s  
and Louisvil le 
of Knoxville, _ 
Lewis Pub . Co. , 
1900 ) 1 293-299 o 
50 Deadrick, 
Knoxvil le Sentinel 
Heart of the Val ley.L 
1 August 1893 . 
200 ; Branson, 55 ; 
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erupted when the railroad offered a canpranise proposal to 
settle the dispute as the case pended in court . Once again, 
a najori ty of the city counci 1 favored the proposal , and 
passed a resolution to that effect . And once again, the 
Mayor disagreed. He believed the city stood a good chance of 
winning the appeal , and accordingly, he vetoed the 
campranise resolution. Rnoxvi l lians then waited to see if 
the city ccnmcil , and in particular the najority "clique" of 
aldetmen cal lahan, Jarnagin, Ashe, Kennedy I Nelson and 
Bailey,  the same one that supported the I<NC ordinance, 
override or sustain the Mayor's veto. 51 
would 
Pending this decision, sane nervous citizens �iled an 
injtmction bil l ,  which the court soon granted, to enjoin the 
city ccnmcil fran accepting any carrprard.se resolution fran 
the railroad company . This injunction, as wel l as the 
nayor' s  veto message, articulated many of the reasons sane 
Knoxvil lians opposed fulfilling the city's  contract with the 
railroad. 52 
According 
violated various 
to the injunction, the rail road canpany 
tems of the contract which nul lified 
had 
the 
city ' s  obligation to pay the subscription. When he vetoed 
the first canpranise plan, Mayor Thanpson argued that the 
51 Knoxville Sentinel 12 August 1893 ; Knoxville Journal 
12 August 1893 . 
52 Ibid. 
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city never agreed simply to give the rail road $225,000 , but 
rather, pranised to subscribe that moount to the Cat;)any' s 
capital stock. But the catpany had rendered its stock 
essentially worthless through the nanipulations of "a 
construction cat;)any, financial agents , bonds and 
tmrtgages . "  The Mayor concluded that "we should observe all 
obligations , which in good conscience should be binding, 
even though not legally enforceable; but I can not reconcile  
with my sense of duty a gift to an association, which in al l 
its dealings has failed in every observance of good 
faith. " 53 
While these controversies brewed, 1 ocal newspaper 
editors worried that the discord they provoked endangered 
the city' s  progress . Journal editors cal led for 
Knoxvil lians , especial ly councilmen, to lay aside 
differences and jealousies : 
It is when we have pul led together that Knoxvil le 
has taken steps forward. Jealousy, strife, petty 
bickering and pul ling in al l directions with 
diverse and antagonistic objects never built a 
city . . .  a confusion of purposes are a mill  stone 
around the neck of a city. Let us lay aside every 
weight and the contE!II'Ptible . . .  jealousy 
54 which besets us ,  and we wil l  profit by it . 
The Journal nervously adrronished readers that no reason 
existed to give in "to angry passions in the discussion of a 
53 Ibid. 
54 Knoxvi l l e  Sentinel 25 March 1893 . 
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matter in which the great bulk of the people have a ccmnon 
interest . • •  Let us reason together like men who have the good 
of the ccmmmi ty at heart . • .  " Even as they diverged over the 
waterworks and railroad questions , the editors of both 
papers agreed that disl.mity threatened the city's progress . 
A Journal writer adroonished Knoxvil lians for splintering 
over the nunicipal questions ,  and noted that "so many of 
these congeries are hostile,  one to another, like the 
children of Ishnael , and a potent reason is given for the 
lack of progressiveness and slow growth. "  Then the writer 
justified the need for harmony with an al legory: 
There is an old story about a btmdle of twigs . 
Separate! y an infant might break each of them in 
childish sport . United they are beyond the 
strength of a giant . The single wires that suspend 
a bridge are trifles;  but welded into a cable they 
bear enorm::rus weights . So it is with a city. 
Adversity finds sport in dealing with individuals ; 
but passes by a cT-ty banded together for 
mutual protection. 
Both pro-development papers , organs for Knoxville's 
businessmen, still  stressed the i.nq)ortance of 1.mi ty to 
Knoxvil le's  advancenent even as the the business-civic 
camami ty divided over an ini)ortant question of nunicipal 
inprovement . 
Despite these pleas for unanimity and canpranise, the 
suspicions expressed by both sides diminished the prospect 
55 Knoxville Sentinel 28 March; 9 April 1893 . 
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of resolving the dispute harm:miously. Discarding the 
pretense that opinions diverged because of honest 
differences , each side denigrated the other's  position with 
accusations of foul play and corruption. SUch suspicions 
fueled much of the early sentiment against both the RWC and 
the K03&L railroad. 
For exarrpl e ,  the proprietors of Shields Brothers 
preferred city ownership of the waterworks over a carpany 
that had never ful fi 1 1  ed its pranises . "The city , "  they 
declared, "should own the water works , [and] the water works 
should not own the city as at present . "  The report of the 
Chamber ccmni.ttee to the mass meeting questioned the RWC' s  
ability to us e  the rooney issued in bonds properly, and 
declared that the work did not require a sum as large as 
requested: "the honest expenditure of $300 , 000 would give 
the city a water plant sufficient in capacity as to afford 
mrple supply of potable water. "  W . P .  King of Bayless , King 
and Cruze questioned the carpany' s rootives in requesting to 
issue such a large am::nmt in bonds .  He believed the carpany 
wanted "to speculate with the water works . . .  [and] water its 
stock for nearly three-quarters of a mil lion dol lars , and in 
retum give the city of Knoxville about three hundred 
thousand dol lars worth of water works improvements . "  Many 
citizens considered the Knoxvil le Water Carpany as 
56 
suspicious at best and corrupt at worst . 56 
, 
Those against the ordinance not only questioned the 
rooti ves of the canpany, but soon suspected those of its 
supporters as wel l • Beyond the aldermen who supported the 
ordinance, stated the Knoxville Sentinel , "there were only a 
few people who favored it , and these few people were those 
who were seeking their own emolument and had their own gains 
in view. "  The first major public accusation of foul play 
appeared in a bil l  for injunction filed with the chancery 
court by a citizens ' watchdog carmittee. The bi 1 1  accused 
the attorneys and agents of the Knoxvil le  Water Canpany with 
ilq;>roperly lobbying and "[securing] seven of ten aldermen in 
favor of the contract . "  It charged "that two aldermen who 
had heretofore found it necessary to work for a living had 
given up good jobs to lobby " for the ordinance . "  57 
The Sentinel denied that it directly accused anyone of 
bribery, but nevertheless claimed that an impression of 
misconduct camdtted by council members prevailed aroong 
Knoxvillians .  The situation arose, according to the editor , 
when a ''MAJORITY CLIQUE" on the city council ignored popular 
opinion and passed an unpopular ordinance that signed away 
the city's  water rights . The Sentinel accused the aldermen 
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with secretly conspiring with "emissaries" of the c�y to 
produce the waterworks proposition, and candermed them for 
rail roacling it through the council .  one writer warned that 
the "people believe their rights are being tratlq)led on and 
that their servants are endeavoring to deliver them into the 
hands of the Philistines . "  Knoxvi 1 1  e had fal l en into the 
hands of a city council clique that sought to control the 
city 's  fortunes and future . This was , indeed, a "sorry 
thing" and "a menace [that has often] proved disastrous . "  58 
Mvocates for the IG'lC ordinance soon responded in-kind 
to such attacks by voicing similar protests against city 
ownership ,  and questioning the rootives of the opposition . 
The aldermen of the city, claimed one writer , could 
"properly and safely disregard the factious opposition of 
men who cover sel fish rootives with patriotic protestations 
and disinterested professions . "  The writer accused "these 
dissidents" of falsely presenting themselves as average 
taxpayers and claiming to express popular opinion to 
legitimize their opposition. Yet , they would never "dare 
publish in paral lel colurms their actual worth, or 
ccmnercial ratings and their tax assessments , "  because each 
would far outdistance the means of the average taxpayer. 59 
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Not surprisingly,  the superintendent of the water 
carpany , c. F .  Woods , declared that "it would be 1li1Cb 
better for the water works to be in the control of a good 
reliable catpmy than to be at the mercy of political 
jobbers . "  In cities that owned the water system, according 
to Woods , so nany scandals had erupted concerning the 
utility that he was "sick" of hearing about them. Aldennan 
George Cal lahan, the nDSt vocal advocate on the city council 
for the ordinance, agreed that corruption troubled 
city-owned utilities : "Cincinatti owned her plant and 
because of it her political parties were the worst and IOOSt 
corrupt set of boocllers any city in the union was cursed 
with. " And now, "the city was dancing to their nusic with 
exorbitant water rates . "  To sane, city ownership of the 
waterworks system prani.sed to foster roore foul play than a 
roonopoly by the water carQ?any . 60 
Just as in the waterworks dispute, charges of foul play 
soon crept into the rai 1 road controversy as wel l . The 
public, as understood by the Sentinel , once again suspected 
the rootives of those aldetmen who supported the railroad's 
position. Just as they supported the Knoxvil l e  Water 
Carpany, aldetmen Ashe, Bailey, Cal lahan, Jarnagin, Kennedy 
and Nelson appeared to ignore public sentiment and continued 
60Knoxville  Sentinel 15 February; 1 March 1893 ; Knoxville 
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to favor the KCG&L railroad. The editors of the Knoxville 
Sentinel accused the aldermen of "playing" right into the 
railroad's hands .  In accepting the CCDQ?ranise settlement ,  
they pursued their own objectives "against the city , whose 
interests they are sworn to protect , right in the face of a 
nayor' s veto, a court 's  injunction and the people's  wishes . "  
A ''mysterious band of syr'lilathy" seemed to bring the "clique" 
together "whenever they have an opportmi ty to vote for a 
corporation against the interests of the people . "  
If the people would only quit kicking and filing 
injunction suits the kids would soon make the 
corporations a pile of m:mey at Knoxville's  
expense. But the tax payers of the city have an 
exasperating way of objecting to near 1 y every 
great measure the kids undertake to pass . They 
wil l  not even agree to pay the K. 1 c. G.  & L .  the 
half mil lion dol lars that the kids in their great 
generosity want to give that needy 
corporation • . .  Surely the kids have a hard time of 
it . They would so nuch like to serve their 
fri�! but the perverse people wil l not let them. 
In the case of aldeman George cal lahan, the al leged 
leader of the "clique,"  accusations of spurious motives nay 
have been wel l-founded. Little evidence exists to prove that 
railroad interests directly influenced cal lahan's advocacy 
of the Knoxville,  CUmberland Gap and Louisvil l e  railroad 
ccrrQ?ranise . However I one biographer noted that cal lahan, who 
owned a large construction business , was Jmown as "a 
61 Knoxville Sentinel 18 , 5 ,  28 September 1893 . 
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railroad builder of extensive experience and nationwide 
reputation . "  This infoiTrBtion does tend to cas t  a suspicious 
light on callahan's support 
helps explain why he earned 
for the railroad, and probably 
the special vituperation of the 
anti-KCX;&L citizens . Still , no direct evidence exists to 
substantiate such charges . 62 
Opponents of the KOJ&L railroad questioned the wisdan 
of fulfi l ling the city's contractual obligation .  The 
Sentinel warned that the KOO&L debt would increase the 
city' s  indebtedness by $225,000 , 
for thirty roore years, and create 
plus the interest thereon 
a burden that could 
overwhelm the public treasury: "The situation demands 
serious thought and vigorous action. It is inconceivable 
that the business men of Knoxvi l le,  noted everywhere for 
their ability to take care of their own interests , should 
sit in idle indifference and let such a gang as the clique 
get hold of the public treasury again. "  
Once again, the Chamber of Cmmerce sided with the the 
"progressive" business element ,  warning city cotmcil not to 
inq)ede the appeal of the chancery court ' s  decision: "In the 
opinion of the chamber of cannerce the tax-payers and the 
business interests of the city would be grievously wronged 
by any interference . • .  by the city cotmcil with the suit of 
the K<D&L railroad vs . the city of Knoxvil le,  which is now 
62 Men of Affairs , 33 . 
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pending in the supreme court . "  To those against the 
rail road, only corruption could explain why the "clique" 
backed such an unwise scheme. 63 
Like the waterworks issue, the railroad controversy 
revealed conflict not only between the city and a corporate 
interest but , more i.Irportantly, aroong Knoxvillians at large. 
The stock subscription to the rail road in 1887 was 
original ly a booster scheme to appeal to industrial and 
financial interests by expanding the city's  transportation 
facilities . In 1893 , however, sane business-civic leaders 
wanted to cancel the city' s  obligation because they believed 
that the railroad had reneged on the contract . 64 
Knoxville's  "progressive" business element believed 
that personal ambition or corporate influence motivated 
certain city officials to make decisions detrimental to the 
city' s  interests , and to support patently unwise proposals.  
Al legedly, the Knoxville Water carpany and the Knoxvi 11  e ,  
Cllnberland Gap and Louisville railroad lobbied aldermen 
i.Irproperly to propel legislation through city council that 
favored their own interests . The waterworks Cati)any wanted 
to issue an additional $750 ,000 in bonds to upgrade an 
inefficient and inadequate waterworks system, and to 
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forestal l the developnent of a city-owned utility . The KCG&L 
railroad wanted the city to pay the $225 ,000 it pledged in 
1887 to the railroad's capital stock. To a significant 
number of business-civic 1 eaders , both schemes prani.sed to 
saddle Knoxville with mwanted debt without benefitting the 
city adequately in return. 
These two numicipal 
within the business-civic 
Carv?any and the Knoxville,  
controversies 
camnmity. 
C\.D'nber land 
reveal disagreement 
The Knoxvil le Water 
Gap and Louisvi 11 e 
railroad had both friends and enemies am:mg the city ' s  
business-civic leadership . For exairi)le, industrialist George 
W .  Callahan consistently supported the railroad while 
textile industrialist Edward Epps Macf.til lan just as 
consistently opposed it . The pro-development Knoxvil le 
Journal supported the schemes while the praootional Chamber 
of Carmerce condenned them. 
More ilrportant than the fact that al l were businessmen, 
however, is the fact that boosterism pervaded both sides of 
the dispute. Although the Dem:x:ratic Sentinel and the 
Republican Journal general ly opposed each other throughout 
these controversies ,  both were booster papers . The Journal , 
for example, in regard to those Knoxvillians hesitating to 
support the ]QqC ordinance, noted that "caution and nBture 
deliberation are cannendable virtues; but they should be 
based always on scnmd reason and practical cannon sense. 
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Without these elements what is in itself a virtue may becane 
ridiculous ,  and instead of al lies to enterprise 
blind obstructions . "  In other words , if "caution" 
may becane 
rested not 
an "practical camw:m sense, "  but an innate prejudices , 
would not facilitate business prosperity nor aid in the 
city' s  progress . To the Journal , that "progress" toward 
it 
industrial-commercial prosperity was an al l -itrportant goal . 
In early 1892 , the Sentinel declared to be "for Knoxville, 
first, last and al l the time and every business concern that 
tends to build up our beautiful city shal l have the hearty 
and cordial support of this paper . "  65 
Although the Sentinel sided with those who opposed the 
I<HC ordinance, the paper's editors agreed with the Ca'C()any' s 
supporters that the waterworks question was itrportant to 
For example, Knoxvi 1 1  e'  s growth and prosperity. 
noted that wel l-conditioned streets 
boosters in attracting new industry 
Knoxville's pitted and rugged streets 
one article 
and paved until waterworks officials ,  
were ilrportant 
and capital . 
to 
Yet , 
could not be repaired 
whether public or 
private, instal led new water mains and lines below the 
streets . Arguments over the best way to itrprove the water 
system interfered 
delaying efforts 
with the city's econanic advancement by 
to i.nprove the city streets . Potential 
investors would inmediately notice the sad state of 
65 Knoxvi l le Sentinel 18 February 1893 . 
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disrepair :  ''You may tel l people who cane here to look at the 
place, we intend paving our streets , but they wil l  judge you 
fran what they see al ready, rather than by the magnificent 
prani.ses you make. "  66 
The pro-development Journal and Sentinel took opposite 
sides in these controversies, but both believed the dispute 
hindered finding a solution, and thus obstructed the city ' s  
industrial-commercial progress . The Sentinel rerarked that 
"the best and surest way in the world to defeat the 
waterworks scheme ( for city ownership) or other business 
enterprise, is for the people to get at loggerheads and to 
quarrel aroong themselves . Don' t do it . "  67 
In 1887 boosters argued fervently that the city ' s  
progress depended upon a pro-development unity of purpose 
among Knoxvil lians .  Indeed, business-civic leaders 
apparently still  believed that in 1893 and 1894 . Despite 
these convictions , however, Knoxville's  business-civic 
leadership could not i�ose a consensus upon themselves , let 
alone anyone else. And these differences grew even sharper 
when accusations of foul play and corrupt dealings began to 
fly . 
Having established that the rm.micipal controversies 
reflected a divided business-civic community with boosters 
66 Knoxvil le Sentinel 1 February; 1 March 1893 . 
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appearing on both sides of each issue, a question still  
remains concerning the nature of the dispute. Why did these 
Knoxvil lians split over these issues? The 1893-1894 cart'P8ign 
and election for city offices reveals sanething of the 
nature of the dispute because the m.micipal questions became 
central to the caJrQ?aigning of both parties .  Sane 
reform-minded citizens anticipated the election as a chance 
to register their displeasure with city officials who 
backed the corporate proposals by ousting the city council 
"clique . "  
As the Immicipal election of 1894 approached, the 
Knoxville Sentinel editor advised Knoxvil lians to "look to 
the future and watch the affairs of the city. Naninate and 
elect men who wil l work for Knoxville and for no 
corporation • • .  Democrats and Republicans , be on your guard 
and naninate men who will  not be dictated too (sic) . "  Voters 
would remember as the election drew near who stood with the 
Knoxville Water �any and who had sided with "the people. " 
Indeed, if Knoxville's  businessmen had realized ''what class 
of citizens" they were electing to office in January of 
1892 , lamented the Sentinel , the city would have been far 
better off .  "There would have been no attempt at the city 
water cat()any jobbery . . .  nor the Knoxvil le, Ctmlber land Gap 
and Louisville  bond jobbery . "  Knoxvil le's  voters , however , 
would not repeat the same ndstake twice.  They would remember 
66 
who tried to auction off the city's interests , and thus, the 
people's welfare, to the corporations . 
Wil l  sanebody gently kick a clod of dirt into the 
yet unopen grave of Knoxville's  poor, dead 
aldecnen. Just throw in a little dirt and 
withdraw, sol ennly, fearful ly as fran a suicide' s  
grave . . .  In its persistent effort to defraud the 
people,  or, at least ,  to 
misrepresent them in al l matters of public 68 interest , the counci 1 has dug its own grave . . .  
According to sane Knoxvillians, the "clique's" propensity to 
favor questionable corporate schemes would haunt them during 
the namicipal election of 1894. And, not surprisingly ,  it 
did. 
As the municipal election of 1894 approached, Deroocrats 
and Republicans appeared to square off against each other 
over the municipal questions , as seen in the initial stances 
taken by the local party newspapers . The Derrocratic Sentinel 
opposed the Knoxville Water catpany and the Knoxvil le, 
Cllnberland Gap and Louisville Railroad and thus , the 
Republican Journal , which initial ly favored both carpanies ' 
proposals .  The disputes might represent nothing more than 
regular interparty rival ry. In other words , the municipal 
questions became the battlegrOlmd in 1893 for traditional 
party wrangling in anticipation of the caning election. 
Though the party newspapers initial ly opposed each 
other over the issues , the dispute cannot be dismissed as 
68 Knoxville 
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sirrl?le and traditional Democratic versus Republican rivalry . 
For example,  on the local level , one party was not 
necessarily more pro-development than the other. Knoxville's 
boosters participated in both parties throughout the era . 
For exanple ,  Dem:lcrats Edward Henegar and William s .  Shields 
worked alongside Republicans Cary Fletcher Spence and J .G.  
Sterchi to pramte Knoxvi 11  e' s econanic development at the 
turn of the century, and in 1893 , Democrats George Cal lahan 
and A. J. Albers stood on opposite sides of each numicipal 
question. In addition, the vil lified city council "clique" 
of 1893-1894 included both Deroocrats and Republicans . 
member and Aldenmn Matthew M. Nelson, a Republican, 
the counci 1 with five other clique members who were 
Clique 
sat an 
Deloocrats . In fact , this particular city council had been 
elected in 1892 as a bi- or non-partisan body. 69 
Although both Democrats and Republicans appeared an 
both sides of the controversies , partisanship still proved 
central to the conflict . The prinary point of contention in 
these controversies appears to have been aroong Knoxville's  
Democratic businessmen. Probably delighting in the fighting 
that disrupted the unity of local Deroocrats , the Republican 
69 In his publication on Knoxville,  Englehardt described 
the city council elected with Mayor Melvil le ThaJQ?son in 1892 , 
the ''kid council "  of the "iniquitous clique," as progressive: 
''These are men, alive, like the Mayor, to the fact that the 
growth of the city requires a broad, liberal and forward 
nami.cipal policy, and a progressive administration. " {15) 
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Journal noted in October of 1893 that "it is understood that 
if a certain clique can control city naninations there wil l  
be a partisan race. But , on the other hand, i f  a certain 
other clique of deroocracy gets control of the nachine there 
wil l be an independent race. "  Indeed, with Knoxvi 1 1  e'  s 
Deroocrats 1 "al l [was] not serenity. "  Factional fighting 
during Deroocratic naninating conventions held in the wards 
provoked the Journal to add that ''Knoxvil le's  deroocracy is 
not as hat:toonious as it ndght be . "  A few days later the 
Journal renarked that with the Democratic naninations 
settled, "Old friends wil l  doubtless • . •  proceed to fal l out 
and quarrel over local politics . "  The writer left no doubt 
as to the subject of this dispute: "the water works . . •  and 
the K. , C .  G.  & L .  subsidy wi 1 1  now becane burning 
issues . " 70 
Party deliberations concerning the type of Dem::Jcratic 
ticket to run reflected a dissatisfaction am:mg sane 
Democrats with party leadership. The reform-oriented 
Democratic Sentinel declared before the naninating 
conventions met to choose candidates that "if the party puts 
out men who favor any of the big jobs which the clique have 
sought to fasten on the city they deserve to be beaten and 
wil l  be beaten. "  One Sentinel writer spel led out their 
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complaint more clearly :  
the influence brought to bear by certain 
citizens and business rren on the council 
in the interest of certain measures , in which 
these men had no earthly personal interest , 
only to help corporations · who had sought 
their influence in these matters , and speak 
a word to the 'boys ' MEANS REFORM. "  11 
Members of the Deroocratic county Executive carmi ttee 
met on November 11 , 1893 and discussed whether candidates 
should adopt a definite public position on each of the 
municipal questions . Rnoxville's disgruntled Democratic 
reformers initially did not want to define the suitability 
of candidates by party membership, but rather by their 
opposition to the corporate side of the municipal 
controversies . A candidate should "oppose any proposition of 
the water company which [increased] its bonded indebtedness 
to an amount which [precluded] Knoxville purchasing the 
plant at the expiration of its option at a reasonable 
price. "  He should also oppose any interference of the city 
council in the appeal of the KOO&L bond matter. 72 
Indeed , the editor of the Knoxville Sentinel warned 
several times that if the Deroocratic convention did not 
nani.nate refonn:i.st candidates , nany refonn-minded party 
members would vote independent or Republican. No longer 
71 Knoxville Sentinel _ 21 September 1893 ; 31 October 1893 . 
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would the "politicians . . .  have it al l their own way. " "It is 
a travesty on Democracy, "  stated the Sentinel , "to run a 
party mmicipal ticket sinply in order to give ward 
politicians fat jobs without reference to the interests of 
the people at large. " In short , the "right" candidate should 
"favor legislation that is honest to the people and which is 
not the schemes of designing men control led through 
cliques . .. 73 
One editorial cal led for a refoimist Democratic ticket 
r 
if at al l possible, but a refonn ticket first and foreroost . 
"It is only the ring men, the political wire pul lers who 
ignore the refonn idea, and talk of a straight ticket 
without reference to how candidates shal l stand on rmmicipal 
policies . "  Refor:m-minded Derracrats refused to be 
''hoodwinked'' into supporting any candidate, regard! ess of 
his prani.nence and high standing, merely because the party 
nachine label led him a "good nan and Derracrat . "  The Sentinel 
claimed to have spoken to a "working nan" on the subject . If 
the ward conventions did not produce "decent" deroocratic 
nani.nees , he warned, he and practical ly everyone he Jmew 
would vote a straight Republican ticket , and would not 
bother to initiate an independent Catr;)aign. The Journal 
queried, "Wi l l  the ' boys ' control the Derracratic rmmicipal 
73 Knoxville Sentinel 30 , 27 October; 
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convention or will  the kid gloves and the silk handkerchief 
run 'de masheen? "' 74 
Ultimately ,  the Democratic executive camdttee decided 
against non-partisan candidates . The decision to run a 
straight ticket dismayed party reformers . A Sentinel 
editorial charged that camdttee leaders treated reform 
ideas "as rratters of no consequence and [with] ill-disguised 
cont�t . " The Sentinel added "It was the politicians that 
spoke on Saturday. The businessmen and taxpayers wil l  be 
heard fran later on. " The editor did not expect that 
Knoxville's  businessmen, including many merchants , 
manufacturers , doctors , lawyer, clerks , et cetera, would 
even bother to attend the ward conventions which were 
al legedly "cut and dried before the chaiman is 
selected. "  75 
Such charges soon proved exaggerated as ward voters 
chose prinarily reform candidates for the upcani.ng election. 
The front page Sentinel headline the morning after the ward 
conventions met read ''Well Done Thou Good and Faithful 
Democrats . . .  Ring Rule Repudiated and Dishonest Men and 
Measure Got It Where the Chicken Got the Axe . "  The paper 
proclaimed its satisfaction with the nani.nees except the 
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third ward ' s  choice. There, "the ring run the wild hog over 
the de�JDCrats • • •  and one-----and , thank God ,  the anl y 
one-----of the ' old' kid co1.m.cil was 
naninated-----Jarnagin . "  7 6  
Most of the ward candidates took an imnediate 
pro-reform stand on the municipal questions . out of nine 
ward nani.nees for aldennen , six sided with the "progressive" 
business element an al l three issues . (Horace McMillan 
refused carment and Joseph L.  Wade could not be reached. )  
Dick Jamagin, the third ward incll'l'lbent and "clique" member , 
still supported the Knoxville Water car;»any but came clean 
on the railroad natters . 77 
The numicipal questions appear to be the splitting 
point for Deroocratic factionalism in the 1893-1894 rnunicipal 
�gn. Those who favored strict party loyalty stood 
against those Deroocrats who wanted a reform ticket . Sane 
Democrats favored the proposals of the Knoxville Water 
car;»any and the Knoxville,  Ctmberland Gap and Louisville 
Rail road while others adamantly opposed them. Yet , it was 
not a clear-cut division.  For exanple, inetmlbent Mayor Mel 
Thar;>son ran as an independent against Deroocratic candidate 
A. J .  Albers for nayor. However, both men were businessmen 
76 Knoxville Sentinel 24 November 1893 ; Knoxville Jow:nal 
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and Deroocrats , and both sided against the corporate 
proposals . Alde:man Benjamin s .  Boyd, a dealer in coal , 
coke, wood and lime, belonged to the minority on the council 
who apposed the corporate proposals .  Yet , as he stated 
during party deliberations , he wanted a straight ticket to 
run in the 1894 city election. Stil l ,  a significant number 
of Deroocrats in the business-civic ccmmmi ty found that 
their own dissatisfaction with local political leaders , and 
in particular with their position on these questions , 
threatened to qualify their local party loyalty . . 78 
Once the Deroocrats naninated reform candidates 
(although it was a straight ticket) , a regular Derocrat 
versus Republican rivalry emerged with the rmmicipal 
questions in the center . Rather than ca'fl)rising a pro-reform 
versus anti -reform fight , however, the cat'l;)aign consisted of 
both parties vying to be the "best" pro-reform choice for 
voters . 
The Knoxvil le Sentinel argued throughout the caJI'l)aign 
that if a citizen wanted to defeat the waterworks , the 
Knoxville,  Cllnberland Gap and Louisville and other such 
schemes , "the surest way to obtain his object [was] to vote 
the Deroocratic ticket . "  Unity was essential : "If Daoocrats 
divide there is a fine opening for ring men . If they stand 
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together they are sure of electing men who are both 
Deloocrats and refonners . " Only the Den'Oeratic candidates 
had the qualities essential to a non-partisan, 
business-oriented govermnent . For exaJii)l e, the Sentinel 
found that business principles and Democratic loyalty 
canplemented each other nicely in mayoral candidate A.  J .  
Albers, in Reps Jones, rurming for chai rman  of the board of 
public works , and aroong JOOst of the party' s  aldermanic 
naninees : "Albers and Jones and a majority of the aldermanic 
candidates are business men of 1 ong and successful 
experience . • •  The party could ask [for] no better 
representatives and the business interests of the city need 
wish no better guardian. "  79 
''Patriotic,  progressive and upright voters of 
Knoxville" aimed to elect men who were "not nmning for 
office and seeking to get in for the sake of politics 
alone . "  To the Sentinel , the Del'oocratic naninees (except 
Jarnagin in the third ward) were the answer because they 
were the only candidates explicitly pledged for reform: 
for 
"After the election of the Democratic ticket taoorrow, 
will be no 100re danger that the tricksters and boodlers 
there 
wil l 
work their schemes in favor of the water-works , the 
Knoxvil le , CUmberland and Louisville,  and the Knoxville  and 
Ohio railroads . The candidates with the exception of 
79Knoxville Sentinel 12 December 1893; 14 January 1894 . 
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Jarnigan are all on record against these plots to rob the 
people. " 80 
Although nany Republicans previously sided with the I<NC 
and the Ka:;&L railroad, the opportunity provided by 
Deroocratic bickering proved hard to resist . Having scented a 
chance for victory in the wavering loyalties of ITBlcontented 
refonn-m:i.nded Democrats , astute Republican leaders quickly 
adopted "anti -ring" rhetoric for its political benefit . The 
Republicans endorsed men who ran as non-partisan candidates 
to attract any drifting voters rather than nmning their own 
ticket . Usual ly, however, these candidates opposed 
Democratic naninees and were themselves Republicans . Like 
their opponents , they now linked their favorites to the 
"right" side of the issues . 81 
First , Republicans had to discredit the "reformism" of 
their political opponents . They argued that patronage 
ambitions tmti vated the Deroocratic decision to run a party 
ticket , and canceled out the fact that the Deroocrats had 
naninated reformist candidates . The Republican Journal 
praised the Democratic choices for ITByor and chaitman of the 
board of public works . "It is well , "  the editor wrote , 
"since partisanship in local numicipal government must go, 
80 Knoxvi l le Sentinel 17 , 18 January 1894; 12 December 
1893 ; 14 , 19 January 1894. 
81 Knoxville  Sentinel 19 January 1894 . 
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that the democrats have st\11lbled on two excel lent gentlemen 
to head the ticket. "  Unfortlmately,  candidates A. J .  Albers 
and Reps Jones bad "cut themselves off fran republican and 
independent support by pasting the label 'Democrat ' so 
conspicuously on their garments . "  The Journal praised 
mayoral naninee A. J .  Albers as a frugal and wise 
businessman, and declared that in any other situation, the 
Republican paper would endorse his candidacy. By running on 
a straight Democratic ticket , however, ''he represents one 
idea and no principle.  His candidacy sin\ply means offices 
for his fol lowers . "  82 
The Journal s\.DliiBrily dismissed the reform sentiment 
am:mg sane of Knoxvi 1 1  e '  s Democratic businessmen. 
That is the milk in the coconut of this partisan 
JOOVement . It is a struggle for pie for the 
faithful with a few rich, juicy slices of 
fruitcake for the inner ring. Its highest purpose 
is to control the board of public works and thus 
control the payrol ls of the city govemrnentg3 Otherwise the race would be non-partisan. 
In the ninth ward , Republicans held a political meeting 
attended by nany "laboring men" . They came to hear two 
speakers fran "the ranks" discuss the rmmicipal catr()aign. 
Evan Jones , fonnerly in the rol ling mill business but now in 
the marble industry (and later the superintendant of the 
Knoxville Iron eat;�any) , spoke on the Wilson bil l  and the 
82 Knoxvil le Journal 29 Noveni)er 1893 . 
83 Ibid. 
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protective tariff . Then, he focused on the local race. He 
endorsed Republican Tharas Price for ninth ward aldeman, 
and concluded his speech by "roasting the rings and cliques 
who have had the control of rmmicipal affairs . "  84 
The Republicans had an advantage in this election when 
denmmcing ring politics because only one member of the 
"clique" was Republican. This enabled them to use the 
opposing party as a convenient scapegoat . Local attorney E.  
F.  Mynatt blasted the carpetition during yet another meeting 
in the ninth ward. He argued that the DErrocrats would "ruin" 
Rnoxvil l e  if they continued to run the city govemrnent ,  and 
the city's  condition reflected their incarpetence : 
Knoxvi l l e  is in a worse condition now than any 
city in the cotmtry, and taxes continue to climb 
higher and higher. The kid council is getting the 
spoils and we are getting the devil and a few 
other undesirable things . . .  if it were not for 
such corrupt legislation, RnoxvilL! would be in 
better condition than she is in. 
If the DErrocrats succeeded in electing A. J .  Albers as 
mayor, Mynatt predicted, "we wil l  soon smel l the water works 
and the city's  $100 ,000 stock in the Knoxvil l e  and Ohio 
railroad bonds . "  Republicans should naninate John Hudiburg , 
W .  E.  Gibbins or capt . s .  P. Evans for mayor , and reme!llber 
that the Knoxvil le Water Carpany stood behind Democratic 
84 Knoxville Journal 30 December 1893 . 
85 Knoxvil le Journal 9 December 1893 . 
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naninee Reps Jones . By dencnmcing the "ring" and "clique" , 
and warning of Democratic ties to the "iniquitous" corporate 
interests , the Republicans hoped to erase fran the tnem:)ries 
of Knoxville's  voters their own previous advocacy of al l 
three corporate interests . 86 
Predictions that any association with the corporate 
side of the controversies would determine a candidate's 
success or failure in the election appeared to cane true . 
For exaJrple, the Sentinel claimed that its muckraking 
articles which revealed the ''kid council" prostituting 
public office for personal advantage 
electoral defeat : ''The water works , 
caused the clique's 
the KCX;&L and the K&O 
conspiracies have been driven fran the field. "  The three 
great municipal questions , ''The Politician" stated in a 
letter, were uppetmest in Knoxvil lians ' minds as they voted. 
Any candidate they believed favored these interests lost 
votes as a result.  Thus ,  the knowledge that Albers had 
business associations with E.  J .  Sanford canceled out his 
proclamations of reform and spelled his defeat . In addition, 
claimed another Albers ' supporter, "clique" leader George 
Cal lahan, "a waterworks advocate, a Knoxvil le and Augusta 
stock sale pleader, and a Knoxville,  omtberland Gap and 
Louisville bond issue manipulator, "  seconded Albers ' 
nanination during the Deroocratic naninating convention. This 
86 Knoxvil le Journal 19 December 1893 . 
endorsement 
Albers . 87 
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by a "clique" member cast suspicion on 
SUch connections al legedly affected other candidates as 
wel l .  For exalli)le, Dem:x:ratic naninee for alderman of the 
eighth ward , Tim Donahoe, al legedly lost because he ran a 
restaurant in the East Tennesee, Virginia and Georgia depot . 
Apparently, ward voters feared that this corporate 
connection might influence him �roperly. The same fate met 
clique member Richard Jarnagin' s  bid for re-election in the 
third ward. According to the Sentinel , "candidates of the 
party who were wel l Jmown to be natural ly and consistently 
opposed to the tiDilopolistic plots had no difficulty in 
securing election. "  88 
Personal factionalism ammg Dem:lcrats perhaps explains , 
at least partly, why sane l)em:)crats split over the nrunicipal 
questions. Perhaps the RNC and the KOO&L railroad issues 
merely provided new anmunition to factions al ready engaged 
in a local political battle. On December 17 , 1893 , the 
Knoxville Journal speculated why sane Deoocrats opposed the 
city council "ring . "  The Journal suggested that they opposed 
the clique because it interfered with their own political 
ambitions , and not because it irrpeded the city' s  progress . 
1893 . 
87 Knoxvil le Sentinel 27 , 22 January 1894 ; 23 November 
88 Knoxville Sentinel 24  January 1894 . 
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One Journal reporter claimed to have overheard a Democrat 
rerrark that "Gen. J .  c. J .  Wil liams; Col . W .  L .  Ledgerwood; 
Col . Tharas L .  Wil liams; Col . G.W.  Mabry and Hon. S .  G .  
Heiskel l" once were "notable leaders" of the party. Now, 
however, they fO\md themselves "shut out by the ring and 
1 eft to flock by themselves . They are utterly excamnmicated 
from participating in the great and glorious privilege of 
being members of the ring . "  89 
Mostly attorneys , these frustrated political leaders 
al legedly insisted that the current "ring" was "a little 
fresh" to be dictating Democratic pol icy. The "clique ' s" 
Democracy only dated back a few years whereas they 
themselves were "the Democratic standardbearers [who had] 
borne the heat and burden of the day for the past 
twenty-five years . Thus ,  a "generation-gap" factionalism, 
between older Deroocrats with a longer record of service to 
the party and a yotmger group who c�rised a rrajority on 
the city comcil , rray have generated sane of the opposition 
to schemes the ''kid cotmcil" advocated. The fact that both 
Democrats and Republicans adopted pro-reform rhetoric to 
gamer support during the rmmicipal cmrpaign, however, 
suggests that real displeasure with city government existed 
in Rnoxville's  business-civic carmmity . Both parties hoped 
to capitalize on this dissatisfaction by linking their 
89 Rnoxville  Journal 17 December 1893 . 
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candidates to the reform side of the issues . Thus , while 
local factionalism perhaps explains why sane DEmocrats and 
businessmen chose one side over another, it does not explain 
the nature of the discontent expressed by sane 
business-civic leaders . 90 
A significant part of this opposition reflected a 
concern that the RWC and KCG&L schemes ultinately would 
saddle the city with unwanted and unwise debt . For example, 
sane citizens opposed the ordinance proposed by the RWC 
because it requested to issue $750 , 000 in bonds to upgrade 
the waterworks system. In five years , however, the RWC ' s 
contract with the city would expire . At that time , as stated 
in the current contract , the city could buy the waterworks . 
Purchasing the system, however, also meant assuming the 
CQ'l'Pany's original bonded indebtedness which currently stood 
at $150 , 000 . But if the city agreed to amend the current 
contract to all ow the KNC to issue an add.i tiona! $750 ,000 in 
bonds , as requested, the indebtedness of the CQ'l'PanY would 
increase narkedly :  ''By the proposed ordinance it is claimed 
by responsible and sensible business men that the bonds to 
be issued wil l  be so great that the load wil l  forever bar 
the city fran buying . "  91 
As for the KCG&L Rail road, many Knoxvil l ians questioned 
90 Ibid. 
91 Knoxvil l e  Sentinel 26 January 1894 ; 20 March 1893 . 
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whether the caq;�any had caq;�lied ful ly with the original 
contract . Those who opposed paying the pramsed $250 ,000 
subsidy to the railroad objected to increasing the city ' s  
debt for a ccmpany which, in their view, never fulfilled its 
own contractual obligations . To reform-minded Knoxvil lians , 
both proposals were questionable schemes 
to increase the city's debt at the expense 
that only pramsed 
of taxpayers . 92 
Worrying over the state of the national eccmany 
probably helped fuel concern with the city ' s  ass\.l'li)tion of 
new, unwise or unnecessary debt . Fran 1893 into 1897 , a 
ful l-scale industrial and agricultural depression hit al l 
parts of the country . An eccmamc col lapse in the railroad 
business spread to associated industries , and when canbined 
with the weakening of confidence in the gold standard, 
triggered a general business col lapse throughout the 
country . According to one author, the South surpassed the 
national average in the percentage of business failures 
throughout the depression. Knoxvil le did not escape the 
crunch of depression in 1893 . Like roost other cities 
throughout the nation, in Knoxville railroads went into 
receivership; caq;�anies reduced their labor force; 
rerrained a consistent problem; and the ranks of 
the poor and needy swel led. In August of 1893 , the East 
Tennessee Railroad announced that a need for retrenchment 
92 Knoxville  Sentinel 5 August 1893 . 
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cat;)elled the cat;)any to reduce individual pay by ten to 
twenty percent . This came after the railroad had reduced its 
labor force and payrol l  ''by thousands" already over the past 
few mmtbs . 93 
Even a mmth before the Panic erupted, Knoxvil le bad 
difficulty accommodating the needs of the 1 ocal poor. A 
Sentinel article in January of 1893 noted that the Charity 
Relief Headquarters found it necessary to move fran the city 
hal l to a Gay Street address . The tremendous ntlllber of 
people caning to the city hall for charity was actual ly 
threatening the safety of the building, ostensibly because 
it bad not been constructed to hold such numbers . On one 
Saturday I aboost 2 1000 people received charity relief ; on 
the foi l owing Monday I over 1 1  500 ; Tuesday I over 600 ; and 
Wednesday over 700 . In fact I by Thursday I the Relief 
headquarters 
had nm out . 
had to suspend 
94 
food services because supplies 
In August of 1893 , recognizing the faltering state of 
the local econany I the Knoxville Journal suggested that city 
council repeal penal ties on unpaid taxes for ninety days in 
order to relieve the pressure to pay in September. Because 
of the nation' s  financial straits I ''Rich men and poor men 
93 Knoxvil le Sentinel 21 , 241 30 August ; 25 September 
1893 . 
94 Knoxvil le Sentinel 19 January 1893 . 
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find, at this time, their taxes burdensane • • •  htmdreds of 
men • • •  have been enforcedly idle for weeks past . Their taxes 
are unpaid. They have no I'IDiley with which to pay them. " The 
Joumal hoped the city could survive without the extra 
revenue for ninety days . If the city council would "pass an 
ordinance postponing the �i tion of penal ties until that 
time IIBllY men [would] rise up to cal l it blessed." The 
Depression of 1893 hardly presented the best time to 
consider increasing Knoxville's debt , particularly through 
carpanies with a questionable record. If citizens worried 
about meeting their current tax obligations as they 
struggled with the 1893 panic, they were not likely to favor 
anything that might make their situation worse . 95 
According to the Sentinel , Knoxvil lians took a special 
interest in the financial IIBlleuverings of city government : 
"OUr city offices are roore itr(>ortant to us than those of the 
county, state or nation. They levy and col lect roore than 
half of the taxes we pay, and have the management of those 
affairs which most directly affect our hanes and our 
happiness . " 
business-civic 
Thus , a significant ntmber of Knoxville's 
leaders viewed the actions of the city 
council "clique" in supporting unwise (in their view) 
95 Paul S .  Boyers and others , eels .  , The Enduring Vision: 
A History of the American PeoDle: Vol1.111e 2, fran 1865 
(Lexington, MA. : D.C.  Heath and Carpany, 1990 ) ,  729 ; Woodward, 
264; Knoxville Sentinel _ 19 January 1893; Knoxville Journal 15 
August 1893 . 
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corporate schemes quite unfavorably.  They determined to 
register their displeasure in the approaching municipal 
election: "Let us make assurances doubly sure in selecting 
our candidates , and prevent the possibility of again 
saddling ourselves with a comcil that wil l load us with 
disgrace and cover us with debt . "  96 
Knoxville's  reform-ndnded businessmen believed the way 
to end corruption in city government ,  as represented by the 
"clique , "  was to elect a non-partisan government to be rtm 
by business "principles" rather than personal ambitions and 
political patronage . That meant electing a city cOtmcil of 
"progressive, "  or pro-refotm, 
appreciated the relationship 
businessmen who understood and 
between the city' s  overall  
industrial-carmercial prosperity and their own personal 
fortunes . Rather than judging each scheme or proposal by its 
potentiality to provide personal , individual profit or 
patronage rewards , such cOtmcil men would determine a 
proposal ' s  efficacy by its capability to help the city's  
overal l prosperity and progress . Thus , a corporate scheme 
that only offered to reward an individual while penalizing 
the city with debt would be discarded in favor of one that 
pranised to benefit the city 's econany as a whole.  SUch 
businessmen would not prosper at the expense of the city , 
but rather would advance along with Knoxville as they worked 
96 Knoxvil le Sentinel 28 , 25 August 1893 . 
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to foster the city' s  overal l prosperity . 
The nnmicipal c�aign of 1893-4 aptly deroonstrates 
what kind of government reformist Deroocrats wanted running 
the city. The Sentinel cal led for voters to elect only those 
men whose ''honesty, integrity and business life" were beyond 
reproach. City government had to be above partisan 
squabbling and political corruption in order for Knoxvi l l e  
to advance: 
The future greatness of Knoxville does not depend 
on her ward politicians : it depends on her 
business men. If the city is to be run in the 
interest of ward politicians she had as wel l bid 
farewell to hopes of progress . The only interest 
they have in the city is for their own 
aggrandisement .  With businessmen it is different . 
Their interest is the city ' s  interest .  Whatever 
advancement the city nakes wil l  benefit them. In 
building up 9�oxville they are building up themselves . 
Thus , Knoxvil lians felt it to be "of the uboost inportance" 
that the city have not a Democratic or Republican tTByor I but 
one "who [would] put his veto upon schemes that would crush 
them under a load of taxation and deliver them eternal ly to 
the rapacity of the bond-holders . "  To have an honest city 
government , 
or Republican. 
business-like 
voters had to elect honest men, whether Deroocrat 
And to have city government "carried on in a 
way [voters had to] elect business men . "  98 
97 Knoxvi 11  e Sentinel 25 August; 25 , 27 October; 28 I 1 
November 1893 . 
98 Knoxvil l e  Sentinel 28 August 1893 . 
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The fal l  meeting of the Chamber of catmerce tmderscored 
the desire of many businessmen and professionals for a 
non-partisan city government admtnistered by business 
principles rather than political favors . Organized to 
advance and protect the city's econanic interests "without 
regard to political cliques , "  the chamber' s  membership 
refl ected a variety of businesses and professions . According 
to the Sentinel , it perhaps renained the only organization 
that truly expressed, 
Knoxville's taxpayers . 
if unofficial ly, 
99 
the sentiments of 
At the fall meeting on September 27 , chamber members 
indicated their displeasure with the controversies and 
suspicions that plagued local headlines . The chamber passed 
a resolution that detailed its position on several questions 
of "great importance, not only to the taxpayers , but to the 
future welfare of Knoxville . "  In view of the municipal 
controversies ,  the chamber resolved that 
the good and prosperity of the city and the voice 
of the people demand that , irrespective of party 
affiliations , good men shal l fil l  the official 
positions , men who have the welfare of the ci t:y at 
99 Knoxvi l l e  Sentinel 27 September 1893 . 
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heart , progressive men, who bear their part of the 
burdens of taxation; men of character and standing 
in the carmmi ty , and who are lmown to have no 
affiliations with cliques and rings ; honest men ,  
who lmow their duty and dare to perfonn it . SUch 
men
. 
�e hav-y00 
and they JmlSt fil l  official 
pos1t1ons .  
Demx:ratic factionalism probably explains why sane 
local businessmen opposed the Knoxvil le Water Carpany and 
the Knoxvi l l e ,  Cllnberland Gap and Louisvi l l e  Rail road . Yet , 
a n\ll'lber of business-civic leaders were sincerely disturbed 
that certain city council members , both Democrats and 
Republ icans , backed patently unwise schemes in the face of 
significant opposition to them in the business carmuni ty . 
Refo�st Knoxvi l l ians believed that corruption 
explained why city l eaders supported the I<WC and KCG&L 
proposals . A desire for personal profit or pol itical 
ambitions , or a camd tment to political patronage at al l 
costs , al legedly nDtivated the kid council "clique" to side 
with the corporate interests . Such corruption threatened the 
city ' s  progress , as these leaders saw i t ,  because it led 
councilmen to favor schemes that were not in the city ' s  
best interests , and thus ilrpeded its industrial -cannercial 
advancement .  To refotmers , the solution was to replace the 
political cl ique domdnating city government with a 
non-partisan and refomHTd.nded council of "progress! ve , "  
experienced and successful businessmen. 
lOO ibid. 
As wise 
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entrepreneurs , they would run the city efficiently, honestly 
and successful ly because they were sincerely carmitted to 
the city's progress . Their own fortunes depended not upon 
political favors and corporate bribes , but upon the city' s  
overal l industrial-cannercial prosperity. 
What these disgruntled Knoxvillians failed to mention, 
however , was the fact that those leaders who sided with the 
RWC and the KOJ&L were pro-devel opnent businessmen as well  . 
Like their opponents , these 1 eaders questioned the rooti ves 
of those who sided against them. Clique member aldeman 
5anuel Bailey renarked that he supported the proposals 
because he believed they were in the city ' s  best interests . 
While "there are opponents to progress in Knoxville,  as 
everywhere else , "  he added, "I believe in l etting the wheels 
of progress revolve even if they rol l over a few rattling 
bones and dry hides . "  101 
However each side defined either itself or the 
opposition---whether as corrupt politicians or progressive 
businessmen---in truth, businessmen and boosters appeared on 
both sides of the controversies . Knoxville 's  business-civic 
leaders nay have believed that unity was in;?ortant to 
progress . Yet , they were unable to l ift that mutual 
carmi tment above the mire of political bickering and 
factional ism. Despite the existence of a social consensus of 
101Knoxvi l l e  Sentinel 17 February 1893 . 
sorts 
proved 
behind 
90 
for development am:mg business-civic 1 eaders , boosters 
unable to translate this into a unity of purpose 
important devel opnental schemes . 
91 
92 
The nnmicipal can;>aign of 1893-4 , revolved around 
several municipal controversies and the issue of refonn. 
Knoxvil lians divided over how to obtain an itrproved 
waterworks system, and whether the city should fulfill  its 
obligation to the KCG&L Railroad. Sane businessmen viewed 
the support shown by a majority of the city council for 
these schemes very unfavorably .  When the "clique" continued 
to advocate them even when a significant nunber of civic 
leaders obviously opposed them, these disgruntled citizens 
became suspicious and charged the "clique" with corruption 
and fraud. Reforming city government to eliminate "cliques" 
or "rings" which felt no cCJtl)lmction in acting against the 
city' s  welfare became the primary focus of opposition to the 
schemes . These opponents believed that progressive, honest 
and experienced businessmen were the key to a "clean" city 
govermnent and a progressive and prosperous city. 102 
The IOOst irrportant aspect of these numicipal 
102 In Political Power..L Carl Harris offers a different 
interpretation of local political disputes . He found that the 
major cleavage in local electoral politics was not defined by 
econani.c interests , but by social groups , such as ethnic or 
religious groups , and by IOOral issues , such as tenperance , et 
cetera. Be argues that these kind of issues were IOOre 
prani.nent than econanic ones because local officials had 
little  ability to change econanic policy . On the other hand , 
they did have the authority and police power to affect IOOral 
or social issues ( 279) . 
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controversies is what they reveal about those who opposed 
these schemes . Rather than cCJit)rising a haoogenous group 
carpletely united on how to make Knoxvil le prosper, boosters 
opposed other boosters throughout the waterworks and KCG&L 
controversies . 
That this was not sin'ply a ''businessmen" versus 
"politicians" dispute is revealed by the position of the 
Chamber of Ccmnerce. Whereas the chamber wholeheartedly 
supported publicly subsidizing the railroad in 1887 , by 1893 
its position had changed. The Chamber wanted the state 
supreme court to decide whether the city had to pay the 
subscription, and disapproyed of accepting the railroad ' s  
catpranise settlement .  In 1887 , both newspapers lauded the 
men who eamestly worked to convince al l Knoxvil lians to 
vote for the railroad subsidies . In 1893 , even though it was 
sti l l  a booster paper , the Knoxville Sentinel questioned the 
motives of those who advocated the KOO&L '  s interests . 
Supporting the railroad in its lawsuit with the city , or 
supporting its offer to settle seemed synonanous with 
working for the railroad against Knoxville 's  best interests . 
Boosters worked continual ly to obtain wide support for 
their schemes , and believed a social consensus remained 
�rtant to the city ' s  success . Yet , business-civic leaders 
opposed each other over certain schemes as wel l . Booster 
papers and publications cal led for harroonious solutions to 
94 
avoid public discord, but si.nultaneously accused the other 
side of having specious rootives and working for their own 
interests . 
In 1893-4,  nany business-civic leaders believed that 
local government-corporate corruption comprised the primary 
obstacle to the city ' s  progress . Corporations , like the 
Knoxville Water catpany or the railroads ,  too often obtained 
aldermen's support for their particular schemes , and city 
officials too often took up the corporate cause. City 
officals also relied on patronage to fil l  :inportant city 
offices rather than depending upon the experience and 
suitabil ity of each applicant . Thus , it seemed that no 
harmony of interests could ever daninate the political and 
econani.c scene in Knoxvi 1 1  e.  Reform-minded businessmen 
wanted a non-partisan govemment while others were 
determined to instal l a Des'oocratic or Republican 
administration, proving that old party lines stil l  existed. 
Boosters still  hustled to persuade a populace they believed 
might not agree with them, even as they often disagreed 
amongst themselves . 
Not surprisingly, since 
businessmen and professionals ,  
both sides included nany 
amid al l of this discord, a 
social consensus of sorts did exist . Business-civic 
regardless of which side they favored in rmmi.cipal 
leaders , 
or party 
issues , seemed to agree that Knoxvi 1 1  e needed to grow, 
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irrprove services and attract new investment in order to 
achieve industrial-cannercial prosperity, and that such 
prosperity was the al l-consuming goal . Thus , despite the 
disagreement over particular schemes and the accusations of 
corruption levied upon one another, perceptions of the 
"proper" society perhaps were not so different . 
Few, if any , business-civic leaders questioned the 
�mrali ty and wisdan of capitalist-industrial society. For 
exarrpl e ,  �mst would agr� with the Knoxvil l e  Journal when it 
differentiated between the "worthy" poor and "anarchists" or 
mad socialists . 
1IBil sudden! y 
Essential ly,  the Journal stated that a poor 
unable to pay rent or provide for his family 
represented 
SUch persons 
the "honest toiler . . .  unfortunately out of work . " 
deserved to be "dealt with tenderly and met 
with practical measures of relief . "  But , idle men who merely 
''baooaned" their fate, and congregated to carplain and waste 
100ney on beer that could have been spent on food for the 
family,  deserved little syrrpathy: "When they ostentatiously 
parade themselves on the streets of a crowded city, marching 
under a foreign flag,  or worse stil l ,  under the black flag 
of anarchy 1 they forfeit the respect I confidence and 
syrrpathy of everybody . "  Thus I the professional agitator I 
"the professional idler, the professional calamity-howler , 
the I'IBil who believes that the world owes him a l iving 
whether he works or not I should not be confounded with the 
96 
honest man who is glad to earn his living when he can . "  In 
short , the poor were worthy of help only so l ong as they did 
not criticize the society in which they suffered. 103 
If most business-civic leaders had a shared perception 
of progress and of the "proper" society, the abtmdance of 
disagreement among them reveals that significant political 
dissent could co-exist with "ideological" or "philosophical" 
accord. Business-civic 1 eaders wanted a progressive city 
with a prosperity to rival Atlanta or Nashvil le .  SUccess to 
them meant obtaining a thriving industrial -cannercial city 
that continued to grow, expand and progress . Boosters 
failed, however , to keep a ccmoon cannitment to 
industrial-commercial developnent above local personal and 
political squabbl ing. Ultimately,  Knoxvi l l e ' s  pranoters , for 
al l their efforts , failed to turn a social consensus for 
development 
developnental 
into a tmi ty of purpose behind important 
schemes . 
Although hunan decisions could wield significant power 
detemdning the course of developnent , establishing a clear 
and direct relationship between hunan actions and the rate 
of industrial growth or decline proves difficult . The 
relationship of boosterism to industrial growth presents a 
"chicken-and-egg" dilemna . Did industrial growth arise fran 
a successful booster program, or did boosterism emerge 
103Knoxvi 1 1  e Joumal 1 September 1893 . 
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because active growth encouraged its developnent? Put 
another way, did a lack of industrial growth indicate an 
unsuccessful recruitment effort , or did declining or 
stagnating industrial growth produce weak boosterism? Did 
opposition to the booster vision hinder industrial growth, 
or did econanic stagnation produce an anti -booster 
atmosphere? Business-civic leaders bel ieved that to 
influence econanic development they had to sustain private 
and public cooperation am:mg business proprietors , local 
government and a significant percentage of the electorate. 
In their view, both the ability to maintain a facade of 
consensus or to disrupt it could affect Knoxville 's  econanic 
future significantly. 104 
104 In New Mel!, Doyle argues that city growth is 
determined at least partly by human decisions which should be 
seen as choices , not "autCJIBtic responses to clearly perceived 
opportunities . "  For exarr;>le,  "railroads ,  banks ,  factories , 
hotels ,  industrial expositions , and sewer systems did not just 
spring up; they were the products of l ocal planning, pranotion 
of investment , and government legislation" (17 ) . However , 
William N .  Parker in "The South in the National Econany , 1865-
1970" Southem. Ecanani.c Joumal_ 46 (April 1980) , discounts the 
influence of individual , and perhaps even col lective, human 
decisions on southern econanic developnent . He sees the South 
fran the postwar period into the twentieth century in a "fixed 
m:xie of underdevelopnent" due to significant underlying social 
conditions , including the destruction of physical capital ; 
northern and southern racism; and the lack of a strong 
indigenous industrial-commercial capitalism. These conditions 
hindered the flow of labor both within and into and out of the 
South, and subsequently, ilr;>eded econanic growth and 
development . Parker Inl.IUII\lZes the capability of human 
decision-naking alone to alter the southern econany. Altering 
this fixed m:xie of underdevelopment required ''massive jolts" 
of "physical , technological and extraneous market and 
political events" ( 1045) . 
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Knoxville  and Knox County did show significant growth, 
in tetmS of population and industry, fran 1880-1920 , 
natching a broad pattern of growth among the other three 
principal counties and cities . 1880-1890 was a decade of 
tremendous growth for the county as the population 
increased by 40%; industrial establishments by 94 . 9%; total 
capital by 411 . 6% ;  the wage-earning 
the value of products by 310\ . 105 
population by 547%; and 
Although the rate of growth appears to have slowed in 
the next decade {1890-1900) , possibly because of the 
national depression fran 1893 to 1897 , Knoxvil le sti l l  
increased its population and industrial capacity . The city ' s  
population increased by 44. 8% (perhaps due to annexations) 
while the number of industrial establishments only gained by 
6 . 3% which ranked Knoxville in last place behind ME!IIq)his , 
Nashvil le and Chattanooga . In total capital , however, 
Knoxville came in first at a 99% increase and first in the 
growth of the wage-earning population with a 51 . 4% increase . 
Knoxvi 1 1  e also came in first in the percentage increase of 
the value of products , but curiously, showed a decrease in 
105 Al l census data on Tennessee's four principal cities 
and counties came fran the census of Manufacturing and the 
Census of Population for 1880 , 1890 , 1900 , 1910 , 1920 . 
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the aroount of wages paid over the decade, narking an 11 . 4\ 
decline. 
Knoxvi l l e ' s  po�ation growth slowed fran 1900-1910 , 
increasing only by 11 . 4\ and ranking last behind the other 
three cities . This decade appears to be one of industrial 
consolidation for Nashville,  Merrphis and Chattanooga, but 
one of decline for Knoxville.  Al l four cities registered 
significant decreases in the number of industrial 
establishments , with Knoxville  at minus 27 . 1\ losing roore 
than Nashvi l l e ' s  minus 21 . 5\, but less than �his ' 50 . 1\ .  
That these figures probably refl ected consolidations rather 
than loss becomes evident when considering total capital and 
the value of products . Despite the decrease in the number of 
establishments , Nashvil l e  and Merrphis increased their total 
capital and value of products . If the decreases in 
establishments reflected an actual loss of industry, then a 
corresponding decrease could be expected to show in the 
value of products . These figures suggest that in Nashvil le 
and Merrphis industry consolidated, rather than declined. The 
picture for Knoxville,  however, was different . Knoxvil l e  
showed decreases not only in the nunber of establishments , 
but also in the number of wage-earners and the aroount of 
wages paid over the decade as wel l . Knoxvi l l e  ranked behind 
the other cities in both categories , and showed the largest 
decreases . While the city' s  l oss of establishments , terrpered 
100 
by a smal l gain in the value of products , could indicate 
industrial consolidations, the decrease in both wage-earners 
and wages suggests that Knoxville experienced an actual loss 
of industry in this decade. 
Along with the other four principal counties and 
cities ,  Knoxvi l l e  registered 
proliferation of industrial 
1920 . Only Hamil ton County 
a significant 
establishments 
slowdown in the 
fran 1900 to 
showed an increase,  and it only 
a100unted to four new establishments . Al l others declined. 
Yet , al l four principal cities showed great increases in the 
number of wage-earners , the wages paid, and the value of 
products for the two decades canbined. Knoxvi l l e  increased 
its wage-earning population by 141 . 5\; the arrount of wages 
paid by 572 . 3\ ;  and the value of products by 644 . 5\.  
In considering the overal l picture fran 1880 to 1920 , 
Knoxville 's  industrial ccmmmity expanded considerably .  It 
did appear, however, to fal l behind the other cities in 
certain categories fran 1880-1890 and especial ly  fran 
1900-1910 . Figures are unavailable for 1910-1920 , but the 
city shows significant industrial growth from 1900-1920 . 
Although census figures reveal a lag in the city ' s  
industrial develq:.ment from 1890-1910 , catpared to the other 
cities , it remains i.Jrpossible to determine if a lack of 
consensus among Knoxville's  
lag .  106 
101 
boosters contributed to this 
Knoxvi l l e ' s  econany certainly expanded over the period, 
but other factors beyond direct human influence helped 
detetmi.ne Knoxville 's  rate of development . The hills  and 
100untains boosters praooted as harboring untold mineral 
wealth first hindered the establishment of railroads , and 
later the construction of highways . Consequently, ccmnerce 
and industrialization in East Tennessee and Knoxville lagged 
behind the rest of the state . Knoxvil le final ly established 
the carpeting railroad lines boosters had long desired when 
the Louisvil le and Nashville entered the city in 1905 to 
canpete with the Southem system. By that time, however , 
trade patterns were beginning to shift fran railways to 
highways . Once again, Knoxville  fel l behind the rest of 
Tennessee as the surrounding resource-rich but nearly 
irrpenetrable 100untains blocked utilization of inportant new 
avenues of industrial and ccmnercial developnent . l07 
Over and above the question of effectiveness lay the 
fact that voting thousands of dol lars to support a 
particular industry canni.tted county coffers to investments 
with little guarantee of success . The 100st avid, positive 
and engaging booster program might overcane geographic and 
106 tbid. 
107McDonald and Wheeler; Deadrick. 
102 
internal obstacles to developnent without securing a 
guarantee that new enterprises would succeed once 
established in the city. 
Fol lowing the pattern established in the 1820s and 
1830s by Dr. Ramsey and his associates and continued at the 
tum of the century by the city' s  business-civic boosters , 
Knoxvil le has yet to emerge fran an atmosphere of conflict 
and crossed purposes concerning econanic development . While 
trying to naintain a facade of consensus , city , county and 
Chamber of Cannerce officials frequently are found at odds 
over industrial recruitment issues . A recent county 
executive campaign presented an interesting , if speculative , 
congruity between past traditions and present practices . One 
candidate offered a proposal reminiscent of a tum of the 
century booster program. He proposed organizing "a powerful , 
new econani.c development authority" to "end the saretimes 
divisive efforts to bring new business here. "  The scope of 
the Knox county Investment Daninion included powers to "sel l 
or lease county property to private c�es , develop new 
industrial parks , give new businesses financial incentives 
and develop Knoxville 's  marketing strategies and advertising 
CSJTQ;)aigns . "  Ccrr;>laining that no one voice spoke for 
Knoxville 's  econanic developnent , one county ccmn:i.ssioner 
supported the proposal as a means to formulate a new 
consensus concerning Knoxville 's  econanic future . Candidates 
103 
criticized the incumbent for not · being "progressive enough" 
in pursuit of industrial opportunities . Both the Republican 
and Deroocratic candidates claimed Executive Dwight Kessel ' s  
"attitude toward new industry . • .  [had] stymied the county' s  
growth 
County 
and development . "  Kessel declared 
an attractive location . . .  [through] 
that ''naking Knox 
inproving the 
infra-structure---roads , sewers and utilities---around 
industrial sites" to be roore inq)ortant than actively 
recruiting new industries . 108 
ln'portant industrial inducements in 1890 remain 
relatively unchanged a century later . In 1893 , Knoxville 's  
pranoters wanted to improve city streets to facilitate their 
efforts to recruit new industry. In 1990 , the county 
government under the direction of County Executive Dwight 
Kessel 
built 
struck a deal with a Michigan 
a new enclosed shopping mal l 
firm. If Forbes-Cohen 
in West Knoxville,  as 
promised, the county 
improve public access 
would improve the surrounding roads 
to the new nall . Social cohesion 
continues to be a concern to pranoters of econanic 
development as wel l .  For example, nn1ch like 
tum-of-the-century boosters , a Deroocratic candidate for 
county executive asked in March of 1990 , "Wouldn' t  it be 
wonderful if we started the 1990s with a climate of 
cooperation, if we al l realized that no entity can do it 
108Knoxvil l e  News-Sentinel 26 March 1990 . 
to 
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alone, that it didn ' t  becare i.rrqx>rtant who gets the credit 
for the new industry, but that we get the new industry?" 109 
A century has passed since Wil liam J .  Oliver exhorted 
Knoxvil lians to be "of one faith when anything canes up that 
wil l  tend to advance Knoxville's  interests . "  Yet, boosters 
in the late twentieth c�tury still  struggle to implement a 
vision of econani.c progress dependent upon cohesion where 
division predani.nates .  110 
109 Ibid. 
110Kn.oxvil l e  Market Annual . 
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